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6Makroökonomische Folgen der Über-
alterung und des arbeitssparenden 
technologischen Wandels
Demographische Prognosen gehen von einem 
deutlichen Alterungsprozess der Bevölkerung in 
den kommenden Jahrzehnten aus. Die damit ver-
bundenen Veränderungen in Quantität und Quali-
tät der Arbeitskräfte werden sich auf die langfris-
tigen wirtschaftlichen Perspektiven auswirken. 
Diese Studie untersucht die wirtschaftlichen Im-
plikationen aktueller demografischer Prognosen 
für eine Reihe großer Industrieländer – die größ-
ten Mitgliedstaaten der EU, USA und Japan – 
und Österreich als Beispiel für eine kleine of-
fene Volkswirtschaft. Im Mittelpunkt der Studie 
steht das Zusammenspiel von demografischen 
und technologischen Trends. Die Studie erweitert 
die Methodik des „Ageing Reports“ der Europäi-
schen Kommission, indem sie die Auswirkungen 
von Größe und Zusammensetzung der Bevölke-
rung im erwerbsfähigen Alter auf das Produktivi-
tätswachstum und die Produktivitätswirkung der 
IKT-Intensität als Maß für den arbeitssparenden 
technologischen Wandel berücksichtigt.
Macroeconomic Consequences of 
Ageing and Directed Technological 
Change
Demographic projections foresee a pronounced 
population ageing process in the coming decades. 
The associated changes in quantity and quality 
of labour will have an impact on the long-term 
economic outlook. This study discusses economic 
implications of current demographic projections 
for a set of large industrialized economies, which 
include the largest member states of the EU, the 
USA and Japan, as well as Austria as an example of 
a small open economy. The focus of the study is the 
interplay between demographic and technological 
trends. The study extends the methodology of 
the European Commission’s Ageing Report by 
considering the effects of size and composition of 
the working-age population on the productivity 
growth and productivity effect of the ICT-intensity 
as a measure of directed technological change.
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91 introduction
create unexpected variation in demographic 
indicators. Consequently, population forecasts 
typically assume smooth developments for 
fertility and mortality rates, and they usually 
incorporate smooth migration patterns. One 
of the most persistent patterns emerging in 
population forecasts is a marked process of 
ageing in industrialized countries. Ageing will 
change the size of the working-age population. 
Gradual declines in fertility rates imply that large 
cohorts that retire will be followed by smaller 
cohorts. Ageing will shift the composition of the 
working-age population by lowering the share of 
young and middle-aged cohorts relative to older 
ones. In the case of industrialized countries both 
developments coincide.
The consequences of ageing on public spending 
have received considerable attention in economic 
literature and policy debate. Population ageing 
increases age-related public spending (Gruber – 
Wise, 1998; Bloom et al., 2010; CBO, 2019; European 
Commission, 2018). But the economic literature 
has also pointed out the subtler relationship 
between age and individual productivity 
(Verhaegen – Salthouse, 1997; Skirbekk, 2004, 
2005). Studies based on microeconomic data have 
shown a hump-shaped relationship between 
age and productivity, indicating that individual 
productivity peaks well before the end of the 
economically active age. This relationship is likely 
to persist in view of the increasing complexity 
of the working environment and tasks, as well 
as foreseeable increases of statutory retirement 
ages. The empirical evidence shows that individual 
productivity peaks around the age of 50.
The evolution of individual human capital and 
the individual capacity to innovate change over 
This study discusses economic implications of 
current demographic projections for a set of large 
developed economies, focusing on the interplay 
between demographic and technological trends. 
The aim is to estimate and project the relationship 
between the age structure of the population and 
macroeconomic indicators. We consider the 
impact of population ageing on large developed 
economies such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
USA and Japan, as well as Austria as an example of 
a small open economy. 
Taking the European Commission Ageing Report 
(European Commission, 2018) as a starting point, 
we discuss how changes in the size (quantity) 
and the composition of the labour force (quality) 
influence investment in automation and 
digitisation (proxied by the share of information 
and communication technologies and software in 
the total capital stock), aggregate saving and growth 
of total factor productivity. Both the quantity and 
the quality effect have ambiguous consequences 
for long-term output growth. While a shrinking 
working-age population potentially reduces future 
labour supply, it may simultaneously provide an 
incentive for labour-substituting investment in 
automation technology, as a result increasing 
productivity. Similarly, while the increasing 
relative share of workers in the 55–65 age group 
is likely to reduce average labour productivity, it 
may also induce investment in automation and 
digitisation, eventually improving productivity. 
In addition to the effects on productivity growth, 
we consider the impact of ageing on investment, 
output growth, current account, aggregate saving 
and consumer price inflation.
In most cases, demographic trends occur slowly 
over time. Only large waves of immigration can 
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The report is divided into seven chapters and a 
comprehensive technical appendix. Following this 
introduction, Chapter 2 conveys the essence of the 
analysis presented by the European Commission 
in the EU-Ageing Report 2018 (European 
Commission, 2018). The Ageing Report provides 
a backdrop for the discussion of the recent 
economic literature on the ageing-productivity-
automation nexus in Chapter 3, and the current 
demographic outlook in Chapter 4. The study 
extends the methodology of the Ageing Report by 
considering the effects of size and composition 
of the working-age population on the growth of 
total factor productivity, including the interplay 
between demographic trends and investment in 
automation and digitisation. The projections based 
on this extension are presented in Chapter 5, with 
technical details regarding the estimation and the 
projection methodology relegated to Appendix A. 
The final Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks.
the course of a career, typically resulting in 
hump-shaped lifetime individual productivity 
profiles. Training and experience augment 
human capital early on, increasing individual 
productivity. However, incentives to human 
capital accumulation vary over a lifetime, 
depending on the relation between the present 
value of investment costs and the present value of 
additional expected income (Becker, 1975). Fixed 
investment costs imply that the expected total 
return to investment in human capital should 
decrease with age, as the number of years over 
which the gains accrue diminishes. The incentive 
to improve human capital will thus decrease with 
age. The above appears to apply even more to 
the individual capacity to innovate. Since the 
individual capacity to innovate appears to reach 
its apex during younger ages, we should expect 
population ageing to diminish the innovative 
capacity of a society (Canton et al., 2002; Irmen – 
Litina, 2016).
Physical and cognitive abilities decrease with age, 
thus decreasing individual productivity. Studies by 
Skirbekk (2005, 2008) provide psychological and 
physiological evidence on lifetime productivity 
profiles. Productivity improves until age 25 and 
stays at an elevated level until age 45. Beyond this 
age, cognitive abilities, inductive reasoning and 
retentiveness start to decline, whereas reaction 
times tend to increase (Verhaegen – Salthouse, 
1997; Skirbekk, 2004, 2005). This is a universal 
phenomenon common to all societies, sexes and 
people of different abilities. Training programs 
can slow or even halt the decline, but they are not 
universally available and not equally effective.
While the effects of changes in the quantity and 
the quality of labour on technical progress are 
complex, with several factors working in opposite 
directions, we would expect a negative productivity 
effect of ageing, which may be partially or fully 
offset by using more and better physical capital 
as the man-made means of production. The aim 
of this report is to estimate and forecast the 
relationship between the age structure of the 
population and the macroeconomic indicators, 
such as productivity and output, with an explicit 
focus on the productivity effect of the ICT intensity 
as a measure of directed technological change.
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a no-policy-change assumption. With respect 
to our topic, the underlying macroeconomic 
scenarios of the EU-Ageing report provide an 
interesting benchmark, because the discussion of 
economic and social policy issues at the European 
and national level, as well as national budgetary 
planning, respond to the projections presented in 
the EU-Ageing report.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the macroeconomic 
scenario comprises assumptions on the 
development of labour productivity, the labour 
force, and unemployment levels, which are 
combined through a production function to 
produce projections for gross domestic output, the 
wage bill and other economic variables influencing 
public revenues and spending. The real interest 
rate is fixed at a constant value. The output of the 
macroeconomic scenario provides the economic 
framework for the budgetary projections of the 
EU-Ageing report and the country assessments of 
the long-term sustainability of public finances by 
the European Commission.
Table 2.1 presents the most relevant demographic 
data for the European countries in our sample for 
which projection have been made in the EU-Ageing 
report. According to the Eurostat 2016 population 
projection, Austria, France, and Spain expected 
a growing total population between 2018 and 
2060; only France also showed an increase in the 
working-age population. The total population in 
Germany and Italy was expected to decline, giving 
rise to a more pronounced drop in their working-
age population. On top of the declining working-
age population, all countries faced a structural 
change towards younger cohorts (15–24). This 
development was most pronounced in Spain, 
whereas Austria remained almost unaffected. 
The first EU-Ageing report was published in 2009 
(European Commission, 2009). This report was 
first envisaged by the European Council in 2001, 
when at the Stockholm meeting the council asked 
for a regular review of the long-term sustainability 
of public finances with respect to the expected 
tension created by projected changes in the 
population size and its structure. The European 
Policy Committee (EPC) created the Ageing 
Working Group (AWG), in which experts from 
the 27 member states, Norway, and the European 
Commission developed the set of assumptions 
underlying the report and coordinated national 
computations with the analysis and calculations 
provided by DG ECFIN. The report is supposed 
to highlight immediate and future policy 
challenges for the EU28 governments based on 
current projected demographic trends, compiled 
in a comparable and transparent manner. The 
projections feed into the European Semester, 
specifically, the Medium-Term budgetary 
Objectives (MTO) and the annual assessment of 
the sustainability of public finances within the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Four issues of the EU-
Ageing report have been published to date; the 
latest as European Commission (2018) based on 
the 2016 Eurostat population projection.
The ageing report is centred around the main 
request by the council to analyse the long-
term sustainability of the public budget. The 
parts on public spending summarise projections 
for spending categories that depend on the 
age structure of the population, such as 
unemployment benefits, health care, long-term 
care, education, and pension benefits (Figure 2.1). 
These are projected for each participating country 
based on recent population forecasts by Eurostat, 
a country-specific macroeconomic scenario, and 
2 eu-Ageing report
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could have a negative aggregate impact on labour 
productivity, because life-time productivity profiles 
are hump-shaped, and their peaks are around the 
age 40 and 50. France was the only country where 
most of the change in the age structure resulted 
from a reduced size of the oldest cohort (55–64). 
Austria and Italy, on the other hand, were the only 
countries in the sample for which Eurostat in 2016 
expected an ageing working-age population.
Most of the gains in the younger cohorts came 
from a decline in middle-aged cohorts (25–54) 
with Spain and Italy showing the strongest shifts 
while France faced a stagnating share of this age 
group. By now, Eurostat and the United Nations 
published new demographic projections which 
will be the basis of the analysis in the study at 
hand. 
According to individual productivity measurements 
collected in Skirbekk (2004, 2005, 2008), this shift 
tABLe 2.1   Projected development of the total population, the working-age population and the 
population structure between 2018 and 2060
Total population
Working-age 
population
Share of … in working age population
young middle old
Change in % Change in percentage points
Austria 15.6 –1.6 0.4 –2.5 2.1 
France 12.3 4.5 1.0 –0.1 –0.9 
Germany –2.8 –17.3 1.2 –1.0 –0.2 
Italy –6.3 –20.3 1.5 –3.4 1.8 
Spain 6.6 –10.9 5.9 –4.4 –1.5 
Source: Eurostat. 2016 projections. Young are 15–24 years old, middle are 25–54 years old,  
old are 55–64 years old, and the working-age population is aged between 15–64 years.
figure 2.1  Overview of the European Commission long-term projection exercise used for the EU Ageing report 
Source: European Commission (2018).
Population
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pension reforms. Higher levels of educational 
attainment of the younger cohorts will also push 
the future aggregate supply of labour upwards (Url 
et al., 2016).
Multiplying participation rates with the respective 
population age groups and summing over all ages 
gives the labour supply measured in persons. The 
next step is to compute the number of employed 
persons by subtracting the unemployed from 
labour supply. For this purpose, the European 
Commission takes current unemployment rates 
and its recent economic forecasts and combines 
these values with estimates of country-specific 
long-run anchor values for the Non-Accelerating 
Wage Rate of Unemployment (NAWRU). These 
estimates depend on the income replacement 
rate of the unemployment insurance scheme, 
the extent of active labour market policy, an 
indicator of labour market protection, and the 
tax wedge resulting from taxes and social security 
contributions. Countries with an unemployment 
rate above the EU-median level are supposed to 
converge towards the median. If the country-
specific value in 2016 was below the median, 
the country would converge to its anchor 
value. The long-run values for the NAWRU in 
our sample are presented in Table 2.3. While 
The approach to compute the macroeconomic 
scenario used by the AWG and the European 
Commission starts with the labour force 
projection. Based on the dynamic cohort model 
of the OECD (Burnieaux et al., 2003; Carone, 
2005), historical participation rates for females 
and males are used to generate values for the 
future, integrating the cohort dynamics of the past 
ten years. This approach gives constant steady 
state participation rates after a transition period 
of 45 years. Additionally, the AWG incorporates 
the likely outcome of future pension reforms on 
the labour market. Particularly the supply of older 
cohorts will increase if the mandatory retirement 
age increases or early retirement schemes become 
less accessible. The result from combining the 
dynamic cohort model with the estimated effects 
of pension reforms is presented in Table 2.2. The 
participation rate in the youngest age group (20–
24) was expected to increase except for male 
Austrians, who were expected to slightly reduce 
their labour supply, and female Italians, whose 
labour supply was expected to remain constant. 
Females in the prime age and the old age group 
should increase their labour supply in all countries, 
particularly so in the oldest age group, where 
Spain and Italy recorded an impressive upswing 
between 2016 and 2070. This was mainly due to 
tABLe 2.2  Development of participation rates in the EU-Ageing Report 2018, in %
Young Prime age Old Young Prime age Old
2016 2070
Male
Austria 75.5 91.8 61.2 75.3 91.6 63.5
France 66.4 92.4 56.0 67.1 91.4 70.9
Germany 69.8 92.0 77.1 70.6 89.9 74.5
Italy 51.8 88.2 65.9 52.0 85.3 78.6
Spain 57.7 92.5 67.0 57.9 91.2 79.7
Female
Austria 72.2 84.9 42.7 74.3 89.5 59.1
France 58.2 82.7 51.3 59.3 84.4 65.4
Germany 66.6 82.7 65.9 67.8 84.9 73.8
Italy 39.4 66.8 41.7 39.4 67.4 67.5
Spain 52.4 82.3 51.7 52.5 88.1 83.9
Source: European Commission (2017). Young are 20–24 years old, prime age are 25–54 years old,  
old are 55–64 years old. 
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depends mainly on the rising participation rate of 
women and their high take-up rate for part-time 
jobs. Throughout the EU28, total hours worked 
were expected to decline by 5 percent over the 
entire period from 2016 to 2070.
Finally, the AWG assumes the long-term rate of 
growth for Harrod-neutral labour augmenting 
technical progress. The central assumption is the 
convergence of all countries towards a common 
value of growth in total factor productivity of 
1 percent per year, cf. Table 2.5. Because the 
labour share was assumed constant at 0.65, this 
corresponds to a growth in labour productivity of 
1.5 percent annually. Countries start from various 
initial positions below or above this long-term 
growth rate, depending on their position in the 
business cycle. This position corresponds to the 
short-term forecasts of the European Commission 
and will converge afterwards in consistency with 
the medium-term projections, which are based 
on country-specific trends. For example, Italy was 
expected to experience a decline in productivity 
France, Italy and Spain slowly converge from 
high levels of unemployment towards the EU-
median level, Austria converges from a cyclically 
high unemployment rate to a lower long-run 
value. Germany, on the other hand, starts from a 
favorable labour market position and is expected 
to experience a small increase compared to the 
starting year.
The last step for the computation of the labour 
input in the production function used information 
on age- and sex-specific working time for full- and 
part-time workers, respectively. The European 
Commission used the number of working hours 
and the share of part-time workers from the 
year 2016 and fixed these values for the whole 
projection period. Future population dynamics and 
increasing participation rates produce variations 
in the aggregate numbers presented in Table 
2.4. The share of part- and full-time workers 
increased a little in Austria, Germany, and Spain. 
It remained constant for France, while it was 
falling in Italy (cf. Table 2.4). This development 
tABLe 2.3  Development of the unemployment rate in the EU-Ageing Report 2018, in %
2016 2026 2050 2070
Austria 6.1 4.9 4.9 4.9
France 10.2 8.7 7.9 7.9
Germany 4.2 4.8 4.8 4.8
Italy 11.9 9.1 7.9 7.9
Spain 19.7 15.4 7.9 7.9
Source: European Commission (2017).
tABLe 2.4  Development of weekly working hours and part-time ratios in the EU-Ageing report 2018
Weekly working 
hours
Part-time ratio (total) in %
2016 2030 2070
Germany 33.9 14.5 14.8 14.9
France 32.1 11.3 11.5 11.3
Spain 29.9 7.8 8.1 8.4
Italy 32.1 10.6 10.4 10.3
Austria 33.0 15.8 15.8 16.2
Source: European Commission (2017). The weekly working hours are average working hours per week. 
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followed a catch-up process towards higher long-
run growth rates. Italy was expected to need more 
than three decades to achieve potential output 
growth of more than 1 percent per year.
We will retain all assumptions made in the EU-
Ageing report 2018 regarding the development 
on the labour market. We will only deviate from 
the EPC-approach by allowing for an interaction 
between ageing and investment in automation 
and digitisation induced by more rapid population 
ageing and the expected decline in the working-
age population. We also want to include Japan 
and the USA in our analysis. Both countries are 
not covered in the EU-Ageing report, so we will 
apply the EU-Commission method to compute the 
potential output and extract the trend growth rate 
for total factor productivity from the time series 
for gross domestic output in both cases.
during 2016 through 2020, while Germany was 
already very close to the long-term value. The 
speed of convergence was determined by the level 
of per-capita GDP in 2016. Countries below the 
EU-average converge depending on their distance 
to the EU-average. The convergence process was 
to be accomplished in 2045 at the earliest.
The capital stock develops in accordance with the 
sum of the growth rate of total hours worked and 
the change in labour productivity, i.e. there will 
be no capital deepening in the macroeconomic 
scenario, rather the capital-to-output ratio will 
remain constant over time.
Given these assumptions and the Cobb-Douglas 
production technology, the path for potential 
output growth was very similar to the assumed 
rate of total factor productivity growth. 
Table 2.6 shows that Germany and Austria start 
from comparatively high growth of potential 
output and converge from above to their long-
run values. Italy, Spain, and France started from 
a weaker position in the years 2016 to 2020 and 
tABLe 2.5   Development of total factor productivity growth in the EU-Ageing Report 2018, in %
2016–2020 2021–2030 2031–2040 2041–2050 2061–2070
Germany 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
France 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 
Spain 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 
Italy –0.1 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.0 
Austria 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Source: European Commission (2017). Average rate of change over the period. 
tABLe 2.6  Development of potential output in the EU-Ageing Report 2018, in %
2016–2020 2021–2030 2031–2040 2061–2070
Austria 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.3 
France 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.7 
Germany 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.2 
Italy 0.2 0.5 0.4 1.3 
Spain 0.8 1.2 1.1 2.1 
Source: European Commission (2017). Average rate of change over the period. 
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also stressed innovation in terms of new goods 
and services that satisfy an insatiable demand for 
new varieties. In this model class an increase in 
the amount of capital per worker will usually result 
in a higher share of income allocated to capital, 
i.e. a shift in the income distribution from labour 
towards capital. On the one hand, this contradicts 
the long-term stylised facts recognised by Kaldor 
(1961) and updated by Jones – Romer (2010), but 
it somehow reflects the experience of the last 
decade with a hollowing out of middle-income 
jobs and the city-premium for blue-collar workers 
in densely populated areas Autor (2019). 
Acemoglu – Restrepo (2019A) instead suggest an 
endogenous growth model featuring a technology 
that uses tasks in combination with intermediate 
inputs to produce goods and services. They add 
an additional layer to the production process 
by introducing tasks and explain this new 
concept on the example of T-shirts’ production. 
The first task in the production of T-shirts is 
their design. In production one can distinguish 
tasks like the extraction of fibres, the spinning 
of fibres into yarn, weaving, knitting, dyeing, 
and packaging. In the service area there are 
accounting, marketing, transportation, and sales 
activities, which can be considered as separate 
tasks, each requiring different combinations of 
labour and capital to be performed (Acemoglu 
– Restrepo, 2019B). Automation adopts newly 
developed technologies and substitutes capital 
for labour in the performance of a task. In the 
extreme case of full automation, a task will be 
completed by machines or software only and 
labour will be fully displaced. The displacement 
effect describes the consequence of making labour 
redundant in the performance of a task and it 
implies lower labour demand and a smaller share 
Firms are likely to respond to the expected 
shrinking of the labour force and its changing 
composition by substituting labour by capital. 
This requires additional investment and results 
in more machinery per unit of labour – i.e. the 
ratio of capital to hours worked increases over 
time and the production process becomes more 
capital-intensive. This process is called capital 
deepening and is best illustrated by looking at the 
history of agricultural production, where labour 
has been replaced by tractors, combine harvesters, 
milking robots, electronic pest detection systems, 
automated animal fattening plants and other sorts 
of capital. During the last couple of years, a similar 
development takes place among white-collar 
workers. Jobs in logistics, project management, 
retail trade, map drawing, accounting and many 
other activities are replaced by hardware and 
software. 
This process of automation and digitisation cannot 
be modelled within the canonical Solow growth 
model featuring a Cobb-Douglas technology 
(Solow, 1956, Swan, 1956). The Cobb-Douglas 
technology directly relates factors of production, 
like labour, L, and capital, K, to the output of goods 
and services, Y, using a production function like 
Y = f (Ak K, AI L),
where A is a symbol for factor-augmenting 
technological progress, either enhancing the 
productivity of capital (Ak) or the productivity 
of labour (AI). Variations of this approach are 
popular in Solow-type growth models assuming 
exogenous technological progress (Mankiw et al., 
1992). Endogenous growth models added the stock 
of ideas (Romer, 1990) or the stock of human 
capital (Lucas, 1988) to the traditional inputs: 
capital and labour. Grossman – Helpman (1991) 
3 Ageing and Directed technical Change
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shifts the critical value to the right. In panel 
B the critical value I increases to I‘, creating 
more automated tasks. Industries affected by 
automation will shed labour and replace it by 
machines or software (displacement effect). Panel 
C shows the countervailing effect of new additional 
tasks, having a comparative and absolute cost 
advantage for labour, as an extension of the range 
of tasks from N–1 to N towards N–1 to N‘. New 
labour-intensive tasks create additional demand 
for labour (reinstatement effect) and increase 
the share of labour in value added, with new jobs 
created in other, perhaps new, industries.
Automation and digitisation can also be a response 
to actual or expected labour scarcity. In this case, 
the displacement effect can be used to save 
labour input. Acemoglu – Restrepo (2017) use 
this argument to explain the missing empirical 
relation between the growth rate of per-capita 
GDP and population ageing. If the shrinking labour 
force results in lower value added, GDP per capita 
would decrease because pensioners stop working 
while they are still part of the population. A cross-
plot of both variables shows an unstructured 
cloud, and even separating between developed 
and developing countries does not result in a clear 
picture. More automation and a more capital-
intensive production are possible explanations 
because this would allow higher levels of output 
for a given amount of labour. Acemoglu – Restrepo 
(2019A) model the relation between demographic 
change and automation, concentrating on 
manufacturing and middle-aged blue-collar 
workers. They chose the age limit for middle-
aged workers as between 21 and 55, because this 
age group is more likely to be substituted by 
robots. The tasks typically replaced by robots 
require strength and physical dexterity from 
workers, hence they are performed by middle-
aged rather than older workers. The applications 
for industrial robots in manufacturing are aimed 
at replacing labour-intensive tasks and they 
increase productivity. Acemoglu – Restrepo (2017) 
show that countries with a rapidly ageing work 
force, e.g. South Korea, Germany, and Denmark, 
increase the number of robots per hour worked 
much faster than countries ageing at a slower 
pace.
of labour in value added of this industry. If only 
the displacement effect is at work, the set of tasks 
for which labour would be needed shrinks with the 
ongoing implementation of new technologies. The 
extreme case would be a fully automated way to 
produce goods and services.
Automation and digitisation allocate tasks 
more flexibly to factors and thereby increase 
productivity. The productivity effect in turn powers 
aggregate demand for goods and services and thus 
also the demand for those tasks still using labour. 
Nevertheless, the productivity effect is unlikely 
to fully counterbalance job destruction resulting 
from automation. An important additional 
countervailing effect results from newly developed 
technologies creating new tasks featuring a 
comparative advantage for labour. Acemoglu – 
Restrepo (2019B) mention the disappearance of 
some white-collar jobs due to the implementation 
of new computing power and software. 
Although digitisation replaces some tasks, it 
contemporaneously creates many new tasks like 
programming, data base design and management, 
maintenance of high-tech equipment, or 
computer security, among others. Acemoglu and 
Restrepo call this type of automation-induced job 
creation the reinstatement effect. By creating new 
tasks with a comparative advantage for labour, 
labour is reinstated into a broader range of tasks 
and consequently labour demand increases. If 
the displacement effect were balanced by the 
productivity and the reinstatement effect 
together, Kaldor’s observation of a stable share of 
labour in income would emerge.
We illustrate the consequences of automation 
in Figure 3.1. Production combines the output of 
a range of tasks that is shown as the horizontal 
line in panel A of Figure 3.1. The length of this 
line indicates the total range of tasks and it is 
normalised between N–1 and N. Tasks can be 
produced either by a combination of capital and 
labour or by labour only. For tasks above the 
critical value I, labour has a comparative and 
absolute advantage, such that these tasks are not 
automated. We assume that it is cost minimising 
for firms that all tasks below I are automated 
and produced by a combination of labour and 
capital. The introduction of a new technology 
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In their empirical application Acemoglu – 
Restrepo (2019A) use indicators for automation 
such as the stock and number of newly installed 
robots per 1000 manufacturing workers, imports 
or exports of robots and other automation-related 
machinery (numerically controlled machines, 
automatic welding machines, automatic machine 
tools, weaving and knitting machines, and various 
dedicated industrial machines), and robotics-
related patents. To eliminate business cycle 
variations and account for the long investment 
horizon for industrial robots, they use long-term 
growth rates between 1990 and 2015 in their 
regressions. The explanatory variables in a cross 
section of developed and developing countries are 
forward-looking demographic variables, e.g. the 
change in the ratio of older to middle-aged workers 
between 1990 and 2025, region dummies (World 
Bank regions), initial log in per capita GDP, the 
log population, and the average years of schooling. 
They estimate cross section regressions in long-
differences using the birth rates of the 1960, 
1965, 1970, 1975, and 1980 cohorts as instruments 
for demographic variables, thus purging it from 
The endogenous growth model by Acemoglu – 
Restrepo (2019A) is based on a production function 
that combines tasks with services provided by 
older workers (56 and older) and intermediate 
goods. The tasks themselves are performed 
by combining labour input from middle-aged 
workers and capital. We will not go through the 
mathematics of the model and refer the reader 
to the original text. Instead, we focus on the 
implications of automation on productivity. In 
their model, the ageing of the workforce will 
increase productivity in industries with greater 
opportunities for automation relative to industries 
with smaller potential for automation. Value added 
in these industries will also show a declining labour 
share, although wages for middle-aged workers go 
up due to the relative scarcity. Because of higher 
wages, industries relying more intensively on 
middle-aged workers have stronger incentives to 
invest in automation and increase productivity. 
The overall effect of ageing on productivity is 
nevertheless ambiguous.
figure 3.1  The consequences of automation on the use of capital and labour 
Source: Authors building on Acemoglu-Restrepo (2017). Production requires the performance of tasks, normalised in the range N–1 and N.  
For tasks above the critical value I, labour has a comparative advantage such that these tasks are not automated. Tasks below I are automated 
and produced by a combination of labour and capital. The introduction of new technology shifts the critical value from I to I' creating more 
automation (displacement effect) and to new additional tasks with a comparative cast advantage for labour (reinstatement effect).
A) The value of I determines the allocation of capital and labour to tasks
N–1 I N
Labour onlyCapital/Labour
B) Automation increases the critical value for automation I towards I’ 
N–1 N
Labour onlyCapital/Labour automated tasks
(displacement effect)
I’
C) Automation creates new tasks and extents the number of tasks N towards N’
N–1
Labour onlyCapital/Labour
I’
new tasks
(reinstatement effect)
N’
I
I N
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Abeliansky – Prettner (2017) use a simple Cobb-
Douglas production function with labour and 
automation capital forming perfect substitutes 
and traditional capital being an imperfect 
substitute. This model structure has the effect 
that investment in automation capital reduces the 
marginal product of labour while simultaneously 
increasing the marginal product of traditional 
capital. If the exogenous savings ratio is large 
enough, sustainable accumulation of automation 
capital sets in and labour productivity (measured 
as output per worker) grows over time without 
assuming factor-augmenting technological 
progress. The level of output per-capita 
depends on the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function and increases with higher 
automation density, i.e. more automation capital 
per worker. The automation density in this model 
is endogenous and depends on the parameters of 
the production function, the lagged automation 
density, the rate of growth of the population, and 
the savings rate. An interesting proposition by 
Abeliansky – Prettner (2017) is that, within their 
model, a country with lower population growth 
will always have a higher automation density. The 
intuition of this result relies on the relative rate 
of return on investment in automation capital 
as compared to the rate of return on traditional 
capital. While the return on automation capital 
is higher in countries with stable or shrinking 
populations, the return on traditional capital is 
lower in these countries. In countries with a 
rising population, on the other hand, the relative 
returns are the other way around. Examples for a 
potentially low return on automation capital are 
African countries with a low stock of traditional 
capital and high population growth creating a low 
return on automation capital. Ageing industrial 
countries face the opposite situation with a 
shrinking working-age population and potentially 
high returns on automation capital.
Abeliansky – Prettner (2017) test the model 
predictions on the growth rate of installed 
robots in a panel of 60 countries with 3-year 
time averages of the data, providing them with 
7 periods between 1993 and 2013. They control 
for the population rate of change and add the 
investment share in GDP, per-capita income in the 
starting year of the panel, a measure of openness 
endogenous variations in population due to 
migration or changing mortality, which could 
respond to changes in per capita GDP, cf. Table 1 in 
Acemoglu – Restrepo (2019A). The estimates reveal 
a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between population ageing and automation in 
the full sample; the estimates for the sample of 
OECD members are smaller and insignificant. The 
results from a sensitivity analysis using bilateral 
trade data, imports, and exports of automation 
technologies are similar. It is interesting that 
Acemoglu and Restrepo consider computers – 
together with manual machine tools and non-
automatic machines as labour augmenting 
technology rather than automation capital. This 
interpretation, however, could be a result of their 
focus on manufacturing rather than the service 
sector, where computerisation is expected to 
result in a reduction of routine-based labour 
input (Bonin et al., 2015; Arnold et al., 2016; Frey 
– Osborne, 2017).
While Acemoglu and Restrepo focus on the structure 
of the working-age population, Abeliansky – 
Prettner (2017) integrate the shrinking working-
age population directly into a Solow-type 
growth model assuming a constant savings rate, 
inelastic labour supply, full employment, and 
time periods with a length of 25 years. Firms 
combine three factors of production: human 
labour, traditional capital (machines, assembly 
lines, buildings, automobiles), and automation 
capital (robots, 3-D-printers, driverless cars). The 
critical assumption in their model is the degree of 
substitutability between labour and both types of 
capital. Whereas traditional capital is an imperfect 
substitute for labour, automation capital is a 
perfect substitute. Thus, automation capital 
takes the role of a production factor that can be 
accumulated and that is perfectly substitutable for 
labour. Once a task is automated, human labour 
becomes part of a reproducible factor. Aggregate 
saving is a constant fraction of wage income and 
can be saved either by investing in traditional 
capital or by accumulating automation capital. 
A no-arbitrage condition between both types of 
capital implies that their returns are equal. In 
this set-up, automation and digitisation offer an 
opportunity to counteract the expected labour 
shortages in demographic forecasts.
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to international trade, and the gross enrolment 
ratio in secondary school to their model. In several 
different specifications the relation between the 
change in the robot density and population growth 
is significantly negative.
The theoretical relation between demographic 
variables and robot density (Acemoglu – Restrepo, 
2019A; Abeliansky – Prettner, 2017) motivates our 
empirical approach to model trend TFP growth as 
a function of the demographic structure and the 
expected future size of the population of a country. 
Before going into the details of the empirical 
implementation, we will present the current 
population projections for our sample of countries 
in the following section and show that most 
countries will experience a smaller working-age 
population and a sizeable shift in its structure. 
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4 Current Demographic Projections 
such that the value in the base year 2018 is equal 
to 100. A growing population after 2018 will result 
in a value above 100 and a declining population 
will be represented by a value below 100. In Figure 
4.1 two countries, Italy (–26.3 percent) and Japan 
(–41.1 percent), stand out with the magnitude of 
their population decline between 2018 and 2100. 
The other extreme case is the US population (+32.6 
percent) with a marked increase. The big European 
countries either show a modest decline (Germany: 
–4.5 percent) or moderate growth (Spain: +1.5 
percent; France: +8.9 percent; Austria: +11.6 
percent) in their total population numbers. 
We define the working-age population in 
accordance with the OECD as all persons aged 
between 15 and 64. This group provides the pool 
for the labour supply of an economy. The dynamic 
of expected size of the working-age population 
is comparable to that of the total population, 
cf. Figure 4.2. Italy, Japan, and the USA are 
again forming the extreme boundaries on the 
bottom and top of Figure 4.2, while the remaining 
European countries lie in between. Figure 4.2 
also shows historical data going back to 1980 and 
by normalising again with respect to the base 
year 2018 we can show that Japan is an extreme 
example somehow leading the other industrial 
countries. The working-age population in Japan 
peaked around 1995 and has since declined. 
The United Nation’s forecast does not expect a 
reversal of this movement within the projection 
horizon. Germany shows a similar hump-shaped 
pattern with a peak around 1998 followed by a 
modest decline. Between 2011 and 2015, however, 
the German working-age population took a 
break and stabilised. After 2020 the Germany 
population development shows a more wave-
like pattern. A comparison of Eurostat population 
In July 2019 Eurostat presented a new set of 
population projections based on realisations up 
to 1 January 2018 and on updated assumptions 
on fertility, mortality and new net migration 
patterns. The projection horizon starts in 2018 
and covers the period up to 2100. Eurostat applies 
a deterministic projection method, which shows 
how the size and structure of the population 
changes over time if the assumptions made on 
fertility, mortality, and migration prove true. The 
fertility rate, for example, will recover throughout 
Europe and converges towards 1.75. Mortality 
rates will further decline, with the average life 
expectancy at birth increasing by almost 10 years, 
and net migration will be positive in all member 
states from 2030 onwards.
Over the next 80 years Eurostat expects a 
fluctuating population size resulting in a small 
increase in the population by 2040 towards 
525 mio. persons; afterwards, a decline will set 
in, resulting in 493 mio. persons in the year 
2100. The changing size of the population will 
be accompanied by a pronounced shift in its 
age structure towards a more elderly society. 
We use the 2019 Eurostat projections for all 
European countries in our sample. The other two 
big industrial countries in our sample are Japan 
and the USA. For these countries we use the 
United Nations world population prospects 2019. 
While the United Nations projection expects an 
increasing population for the USA, the Japanese 
population will decline over the next 80 years. 
Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of the 
population development for the big industrial 
European countries Japan, the USA, and Austria. 
Given the different size of their populations we 
normalise the total population for each country 
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while the USA will face a delayed and less dynamic 
process of ageing. European countries will be 
in between those two extreme cases, with Italy 
almost reaching Japanese values first around 
2035 and then again around 2100. The process 
of ageing is a regular topic in discussions on the 
future perspective of public budgets. Specifically, 
social expenditures depend on the age of entitled 
persons because pension payments set in after 
the retirement age, health expenditures increase 
with respect to age, the share of persons requiring 
long-term care starts to increase sharply above 
80, and elderly people are more often and longer 
affected by unemployment.
With respect to directed technological change 
adoption another population group is more 
interesting: the group of older workers aged 
between 55 and 64. The theoretical model of 
directed technology adoption by Acemoglu – 
Restrepo (2019A) predicts that firms have a 
higher incentive to develop new automation 
technology if the wage level for middle-aged 
workers (between 21–54) is high (Lemma 1). 
projections with those from the United Nations 
reveals greater dynamics, i.e. more intensive ups 
and downs in the total population (except for 
Italy). Both institutions expect some divergence 
of the total population from the working-age 
population. Only the USA will experience an 
increase in the working-age population (+14.7 
percent), although at half the speed of the 
population growth. All other countries in Figure 
4.2 end up with a lower number of working-age 
people in the year 2100. 
This pattern is a direct consequence of population 
ageing, i.e. the share of persons aged 65 or older 
will increase over time. The process of ageing 
started around 1985. At that time, the share of 
persons aged 65 or older across countries was in a 
narrow band between 10 percent and 14 percent of 
the total population. Until 2018 the spread of this 
ratio in our sample has widened from 16 percent 
to 28 percent, and in 2100 it will have reached 28 
percent to 37 percent, i.e. the share of old people 
in the population will almost triple in comparison 
to 1980. Again, Japan leads this development, 
2
0
1
8
 =
 1
0
0
USAJapan Spain
ItalyGermanyFranceAustria
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
21002095209020852080207520702065206020552050204520402035203020252018
Source: UNO – Department of Economic and social Affairs, Eurostat database.
figure 4.1  Expected development of total population, 2018–2100
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will create a convergence to a range between 20 
percent and 23 percent. 
The wave-like pattern in Figure 4.3 has an 
important implication for the relation between 
ageing and TFP growth: While ageing may increase 
TFP growth over the first few years of our forecast 
horizon, the reversal of ageing setting in after 
2025 through 2035 may then exert a dampening 
effect on TFP growth. 
Figure 4.4 shows the development of the middle-
aged group of workers. Over the first years of 
the population forecast, this share moves in the 
opposite direction to the old-age ratio, with the 
USA being the only exception. Starting from 
values around 63 percent, the share of middle-
aged workers in the working-age population 
will decline over the first decade by around 2.5 
percentage points in Austria, Germany, and 
France. Other countries like Italy and Spain will 
see a more pronounced reduction in the share 
of middle-aged workers by around 6 percentage 
points; Japan lies in the middle of this range. The 
In this case, the substitution of middle-aged 
workers by machines is more profitable for firms. 
When restricting the set of admissible equilibria, 
the authors can prove that ageing will increase 
the wage level of middle-aged workers and, 
consequently, a larger number of industries will 
adopt automation technologies. Figure 4.3 shows 
the expected share of older workers (55–64) in the 
total working-age population (15–64) from 2018 
to 2100. Across the six countries shown in Figure 
4.3 this share currently varies between 19 and 
22 percent (2018) and it shows strong dynamics. 
Apart from the USA, all countries will experience 
substantial ageing over the next years. France 
will be less affected, but Austria and Germany 
will see their ratio climb by 3.3 percentage points 
until the first peak around 2025. Italy’s share will 
increase by 5.6 percentage points by 2031, and in 
the remaining two countries the old-ratio will 
increase by 2035 by roughly 6.4 percentage points. 
The biggest spread across countries will happen 
in 2034 when the US-old-age ratio will be at 17.4 
percent while Japan will reach its highest value 
of 27 percent. Afterwards dampening swings 
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figure 4.2  Historic and expected development of working-age population, 1980–2100
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figure 4.3  Expected development of the share of old workers in the working-age population, 2018–2100
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figure 4.4  Expected development of the share of middle-aged workers in the working-age population, 2018–2100
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start with comparatively low young-age ratios in 
2018 and gradually converge to the younger French 
and US populations.
4.1  The long-run relation between 
demographic and economic 
indicators 
The first impression of the new 2019 population 
forecasts by Eurostat and the United Nations 
provides clear evidence that the old- and middle-
aged worker ratios will move in opposite directions. 
This will strengthen potential demographic 
effects on directed automation adoption and the 
future development of total factor productivity. 
We will now continue with a short descriptive 
illustration of the relation between the long-run 
demographic development between 1980 and 2018 
and several economic indicators suggested in the 
growth literature. For this purpose, we compute 
the average growth rates over this period, or in the 
case of ratios, the difference between their values 
in 2018 and 1980, respectively.
middle-age ratio also shows dampened swings 
over the next 80 years and converges to values of 
around 61 percent.
The countercyclical movement with respect to the 
old-age-ratio has one consequence: The measure 
for ageing used by Acemoglu – Restrepo in their 
theoretical model, i.e. the ratio of old to middle-
aged workers in the population, will have more 
violent swings over the next decades. We can see 
this in Figure 4.5, where the spread between the 
lowest and highest value for this ratio starts at 6 
percentage points and increases to 20 percentage 
points in 2034, which is double the size of the 
spread for the old-age workers ratio in Figure 
4.3. The wave-like pattern, nevertheless, implies 
the possibility for periods of heightened and 
dampened TFP growth over the forecast horizon. 
The share of young workers in the working-age 
population does not vary substantially over time, 
cf. Figure 4.6, although the strong variation across 
countries is obvious. While the USA and France 
appear as young societies, the remaining countries 
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figure 4.5  Expected development of the share of old to middle-aged workers, 2018–2100
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as, e.g., in Eden – Gaggl (2018). This indicator 
does not precisely measure automation though 
industrial robots contain ICT, however, business 
and other service sectors are increasingly subject 
to automation and digitisation. Thus, we expect the 
ICT intensity to be a good measure for the extent 
of directed technical change in the total economy. 
Figure 4.7 compares the change in the old to 
middle-aged worker ratio between 1980 and 2016 
to the change in the ICT intensity of the total 
capital stock, i.e. the share of ICT in the aggregate 
capital stock. For this comparison we extend the 
sample by EU-members providing the necessary 
data in sufficiently high quality. According to the 
hypothesis of Acemoglu – Restrepo (2019A), we 
expect a positive relation between this measure 
of ageing and our proxy for automation. Figure 
4.7 shows no obvious relation between ageing 
and a higher ICT intensity and the correlation 
coefficient in this sample1 is close to zero (–0.05). 
1 We use Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the USA in this sample.
Acemoglu – Restrepo (2017) claim that the 
missing negative relation between ageing and 
per-capita GDP growth is due to an offsetting 
development between ageing and automation. 
Countries experiencing more rapid ageing are 
more actively installing industrial robots. The 
authors define ageing as an increase in the ratio 
of the working-age population above 50 to those 
aged 20 to 49 and compare this difference to the 
change in the number of robots (per million labour 
hours) between the early 1990s and 2015. In a set 
of 49 countries, for which data on industrial robots 
are available, a clearly positive relation emerges, 
i.e. more rapidly ageing countries have increased 
their robot intensity more strongly. They confirm 
their descriptive findings in a multiple regression 
framework.
We do not have data on installed industrial robots, 
while constructing foreign trade-based measures 
of automation would have been beyond the scope 
of this project. Thus, we approximate automation 
by the share of Information and Communication 
Technology and software (ICT) in aggregate capital, 
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figure 4.6  Expected development of the share of young workers in the working-age population, 2018–2100
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robust to using alternative measures of economic 
activity. As a first descriptive analysis, we show 
in Figure 4.9 a cross-plot of average trend TFP 
growth and the speed of ageing. We cannot see a 
strong positive or negative relation between the 
old- to middle-aged workers ratio and TFP growth; 
the correlation coefficient is small (0.28). This 
supports the ambiguous prediction by Acemoglu 
– Restrepo (2019A). If we compare the average 
rate of change in the working-age population with 
trend TFP growth in Figure 4.10, the associated 
correlation coefficient remains small but becomes 
negative (–0.32), indicating that a shrinking 
working-age population may foster TFP growth. 
This descriptive analysis again shows that a more 
sophisticated empirical approach is necessary to 
find a closer relation.
If we compare the average rate of change in the 
working-age population – a measure used by 
Abeliansky – Prettner (2017) to indicate labour 
shortages – in Figure 4.8 to the change in ICT 
intensity, we find a weak positive relation (0.22). 
A possible explanation for the weak relation may 
be the outlier position of Japan in Figure 4.8. If 
we account for year-to-year variations, use a 
more forward-looking concept of ageing, account 
for additional explanatory variables, and control 
for country-fixed effects, a closer relation may 
appear.
Acemoglu – Restrepo (2019A) stress that the 
relation between ageing and productivity is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, ageing directly 
increases the number of lower-productivity old-
aged workers relative to the number of higher-
productivity middle-aged workers, cf. Skirbekk 
(2004). On the other hand, ageing may induce 
directed technical change and thereby increase 
productivity through the displacement effect 
shown in Figure 3.1. The empirical results indicate 
an overall negative relation, but they are not 
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figure 4.7   Historical comparison of the changes in the ICT investment share and the old to middle-aged worker ratio, 
1980–2016
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figure 4.9   Historical comparison of average growth rate in trend TFP with the change in the ratio of old to middle-
aged population, 1980–2016
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figure 4.8   Historical comparison of the changes in the ICT investment share and the average growth rate of the 
working-age population, 1980–2016
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figure 4.10  Historical comparison of average growth rates in trend TFP and the working-age population, 1980–2016
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growth, particularly in the commodity-producing 
industries. Alternatively, Decker et al. (2017) 
suggest that a general lack of entrepreneurship 
and the decline in gross job and worker flows 
indicate a reduction in allocative efficiency which 
dampens the movement of resources to their 
most productive uses, i.e. the US-economy suffers 
from declining business dynamism rather than a 
lack of technical innovation. Goldin – Katz (2008) 
propose yet another explanation for the slowdown 
in productivity growth. They argue that the post 
war expansion of educational attainment reached 
its limit after 2000 because the marginal effect of 
further expanding higher education diminishes 
as the share of high school graduates in each age 
grows over time. 
Crafts – Mills (2017) argue, nevertheless, that some 
empirical approaches put too much weight on more 
recent data and, consequently, they are at risk of 
under-estimating the recent trend growth rate of 
output or the rate of TFP growth. For example, the 
average annual TFP growth in the USA, measured 
over individual decades, shows large variations in 
a range of 0.4 percent to 2 percent per year. They 
conclude that the past performance of an economy 
is not a good guide to future TFP growth. 
We share this view in line with Mokyr (2014) 
and bring the hypothesis that a decline in the 
working-age population and its ageing induces 
investment in automation and digitisation to the 
data of the large Western European economies, 
Japan, the USA, and Austria. Our concentration on 
mature developed economies is imposed by the 
availability of historical data, which is needed to 
make robust empirical inference on the relation 
between demographic change and macroeconomic 
variables. 
The long but comparatively flat expansion of the 
US-economy since the financial crisis in 2008 
and the experience of subdued growth within 
the European Union raised the issue of secular 
stagnation among developed economies (Teulings 
– Baldwin, 2014). Secular stagnation implies that 
negative interest rates are needed to equate saving 
and investment with full employment, and that it 
will be much harder to achieve full employment 
with low inflation at the zero lower bound of target 
interest rates. Furthermore, financial stability 
may be hard to achieve with real interest rates 
close to or below the growth rate of real output. 
Reinhart – Rogoff (2009) proposed an alternative 
explanation for the moderate growth experience of 
the past years by showing that financial crises do 
have severe medium-term consequences in terms 
of lost output growth, higher unemployment, and 
rapidly increasing public debt. 
Empirical economics thus faces the question of 
whether the slowdown in output and productivity 
growth owes to the unwinding of excessive debt 
accumulated before and during a crisis, or whether 
long-run growth deficiencies have emerged. 
Statistical analysis by Antolin-Diaz et al. (2017), 
Crafts – Mills (2017), and Fritz et al. (2019) shows 
that US-trend-GDP, labour productivity growth and 
multifactor productivity growth are lower compared 
to the years before 2000 and have since stagnated. 
Gordon – Sayed (2019) show at the sectoral level 
that multi-factor productivity growth in the USA 
and Europe suffered from sagging innovation in the 
same set of industries. They find a high correlation 
between industries in the USA and a sample of ten 
EU-member countries with the largest slowdowns 
in multi-factor productivity growth. This leads 
them to the conclusion of a common diminishing 
impact of innovations that has driven early postwar 
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demographic change on macroeconomic variables 
through induced adjustments in the structure of 
investment, the amount of aggregate savings, the 
extent of TFP growth, and the inflation rate. We 
integrate the coefficients estimated by a set of 
panel data regressions into a small system of 
simultaneous equations and use identities to derive 
per-capita GDP, the aggregate investment-to-GDP 
ratio and the current account balance relative to 
GDP. The technical appendix shows the details of 
the empirical analysis and the simulation model. 
5.1  Trend growth in Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP)
We deviate from the assumptions used in the EU-
Ageing report in one important dimension only: 
We assume that the rate of total factor productivity 
growth does not converge to the common value of 
1 percent per year, cf. Table 2.5, and rather we 
allow country-specific population dynamics to 
drive productivity growth, conditional on a few 
additional variables suggested by the literature on 
Our analysis starts with the European Commission’s 
approach, combining short and medium-
term forecasts with the long-term projections 
as documented in the EU-Ageing Reports, cf. 
European Commission (2018). The EU-Ageing 
report has been published in 2018 for the fourth 
time and combines the knowledge of national 
experts with a common framework provided by 
the European Commission. The macroeconomic 
framework has already been described in Section 
2 and integrates current population forecasts from 
Eurostat, a set of assumptions resting on steady 
state properties of growth models, and the concept 
of convergence of European economies into a 
neoclassical growth model. 
This approach already includes the direct effect 
of future population dynamics on economic 
growth because projections for the working-
age population directly determine the volume 
of labour used in the production of goods and 
services. We extend this approach and build on 
the work by Lindh – Malmberg (2010) and Lindh 
et al. (2010) and account for indirect effects of 
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figure 5.1A  Participation rates
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figure 5.2  Non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU)
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addition to the negative quality effect of ageing 
on TFP growth, we also take up the idea that the 
expected decline in the working-age population 
will create a strong incentive to invest in the 
automation and digitisation of tasks. Managers 
will implement technical innovations allowing 
for labour-substituting technical progress 
(directed technical change) if they expect labour 
scarcity within the next ten years. We choose this 
window length because automation machinery 
has a depreciation period of roughly ten years 
(Graetz – Michaels, 2018). This quantity effect 
of ageing will be positive, and it works indirectly 
through the installation of automation and 
digitisation equipment. We approximate this type 
of investment goods by the ICT intensity of the 
aggregate capital stock (Figure 5.3). 
The choice of additional macroeconomic factors 
is motivated by Danquah et al. (2011), who look 
for robust covariates of TFP growth by applying 
Data Envelopment Analysis and Bayesian Model 
Averaging to a large set of candidate models. Their 
study covers 67 countries over the period 1967–
2000 and 19 potential determinants of TFP growth. 
For the sample of OECD countries, they identify 
the investment deflator, the savings rate, trade 
openness and the size of the economically active 
population (labour force) as robustly correlated 
with TFP growth. Additional robust correlates 
include country-fixed effects and the initial 
real GDP per capita that captures unobserved 
heterogeneity among the countries.
5.2  Share of Information and 
Communication Technologies 
(ICT)
Rising productivity in the production of digital 
equipment and from the more intensive use of 
ICT equipment and software has been the main 
source of productivity gains in recent decades 
(van Ark, 2016). Growing expenditure on ICT and 
software reflects ongoing efforts by businesses to 
expand data capabilities, improve the efficiency 
of operations and increase productivity. The 
strong decline in the price of ICT equipment has 
helped accelerate the rapid adoption of the new 
technology.
empirical growth dynamics. Population change 
operates through three channels on output 
growth and total factor productivity. First, there 
is the conventional direct effect that a shrinking 
working-age population reduces labour input. 
This effect is dampened in most countries by 
the increase in participation rates (Figure 5.1) 
and the falling natural unemployment rate in 
some countries (Figure 5.2). On the other hand, 
the hours worked only change in line with 
demographic shifts across age groups and both 
sexes due to their different part-time work habits. 
For example, growth accounting for Germany 
shows that the contribution of labour to the 
annual average GDP growth rate of 1.2 percent 
is expected to be –0.3 percentage points per 
year, with TFP and capital contributing 1.0 and 
0.5 percentage points, respectively (European 
Commission, 2018: Table I.2.3). 
We add two interactions between ageing and 
total factor productivity growth to the European 
Commission approach, thus allowing for indirect 
demographic effects. Rather than exogenously 
prescribing a convergence path starting from 
the short-term projection and the medium-term 
adjustment, we introduce an instant response of 
TFP growth to the changing age structure of the 
population. The theoretical analysis by Acemoglu 
– Restrepo (2019A), empirical results by Skirbekk 
(2004), and our own empirical analysis suggest 
that technical progress responds to the ratio of 
old to middle-aged workers. We expect a negative 
quality effect on TFP growth and our estimates 
indicate a marginal effect of ageing between –0.1 
and –0.02, depending on the model specification 
and the estimation method (cf. section A1.2.1 for 
technical details). Based on the model selection 
criteria, we choose the lowest value of 0.02 for 
our long-run simulations. This implies that an 
increase in the old to middle-age worker ratio 
by one percentage point reduces the average TFP 
growth rate by 0.02 percentage points annually. 
Here, a second glance at Figure 4.5 is helpful, 
because it shows the variation in the old to 
middle-aged worker ratio over the simulation 
horizon. Taking the example of Japan, the ratio 
increases by 7.2 percentage points between 2018 
and 2050, implying an average negative effect 
on the TFP growth of 0,14 percentage points. In 
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(Jorgenson – Stiroh, 2000; Gust – Marquez, 2004). 
The use of the output gap as a control variable 
is appropriate since ICT investment is highly 
procyclical and may contain traces of a business 
cycle even after smoothing. Since a positive output 
gap indicates economic upturns and relaxing 
financial constraints, it should be positively 
correlated with the change in the ICT intensity. 
The ICT price is measured by the US deflator of ICT 
capital. We choose the US deflator since similar 
time series for several other countries in the 
extended sample are not available or too short, 
and because the USA is the largest user of ICT 
equipment and the largest user and exporter of 
software. We forecast the deflator for ICT capital 
using the univariate exponential smoothing 
method described in section A1.3.1. The resulting 
forecast can be seen in Figure A1.2. Whereas the 
history of the deflator shows a steep decline in 
prices, the univariate forecast converges quickly to 
a steadier path contributing to the weak forecasts 
for ICT intensity. 
The second set of regressions models the change 
in the ICT intensity of the capital stock. The model 
by Abeliansky – Prettner (2017) implies that an 
expected labour shortage provides an incentive for 
additional investment in automation. The change 
in ICT intensity is related to the ICT investment 
net of depreciation due to economic obsolescence, 
wear and tear, etc.2 Investment is a forward-
looking activity aimed at changing production 
capacity and improving future productivity. 
This suggests the use of expected rather than 
of current demographic indicators. Anticipated 
labour shortages in the future should provide an 
incentive to invest in automation, as proxied by 
the ICT. We assume the expectation horizon of ten 
years. This planning horizon roughly corresponds 
to the economic lifespan of machinery and 
equipment in general.
As an additional variable we include the output 
gap as a measure of the cyclical position and 
the deflator of ICT capital as the relevant price 
2 This change would be equal to net investment if the total 
capital stock remained constant.
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figure 5.3  ICT intensity
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ICT investment on TFP growth has been recently 
disputed (van Ark, 2016), we follow Crafts – Mills 
(2017), who argue that the most recent data can be 
misleading and refer to the literature supporting 
a long-run positive effect instead (Mokyr, 2014; 
Mokyr et al., 2015).
5.3 Aggregate Saving 
The models for TFP growth include another 
channel through which demographic effects are 
transmitted into long-run growth. The aggregate 
savings rate is a likely candidate for another 
transmission channel from changes in the 
population structure towards macroeconomic 
variables. Though the aggregate savings ratio is 
hard to model because the savings motives of 
private households, enterprises, the government, 
and the foreign sector will not be identical, we 
suggest a model including the young and old 
dependency ratios (relative to the total population) 
separately as demographic explanatory variables. 
The main reason to include dependency ratios in a 
model explaining the savings rate is that persons 
in their youth (ages 0–24) and in their retirement 
phase either have no own income or they receive 
a lower income from a public pension and run 
down their assets, which they accumulated within 
occupational and private pension plans. 
Our empirical analysis gives values for the 
response of the savings rate to a change in the 
young dependency ratio roughly between –0.4 
and –0.2. The latter value implies that an increase 
in the young dependency ratio by one percentage 
point reduces the aggregate savings rate by 0.2 
percentage points. The results for the elasticity 
with respect to the old dependency ratio varies 
roughly in a range between –0.9 and –0.3, 
depending on the specification and the estimation 
method. Our model selection criterion indicates a 
preferred coefficient on the old dependency ratio 
of –0.3. To put the above figures in perspective, the 
demographic forecasts for Austria, Germany, and 
the USA expect a decline in the youth dependency 
ratio around 1 percentage point over the next 
decade. This would raise the savings rate over the 
next ten years by a total of 0.2 percentage points. 
The old age dependency ratio, on the other hand, 
It should be noted that the resulting empirical 
model is rather eclectic in that it excludes many 
institutional factors that may impede the diffusion 
of ICT as a general-purpose technology. If these 
factors are constant over time, however, they will 
be controlled for by the country-fixed effects in 
the panel regression. 
The estimates confirm the negative relation 
between expected population growth and labour-
saving investment (cf. section A1.2.2 for technical 
details). The preferred specification is on the 
upper bound and implies an increase in the share 
of ICT capital by 0.1 percentage points if the 
expected working-age population decreases by 
1 percent. Figure 4.2 provides some perspective 
on the potential size of this effect. It shows the 
expected change in the working-age population 
for the countries in our sample. While the 
working-age population in the USA will increase 
over the full simulation period, Austria’s and 
France’s working-age population will remain 
stable. Only the remaining countries will receive 
a positive impulse on TFP growth resulting from 
higher incentives to implement directed technical 
change. Specifically, starting in 2018 and looking 
forward over the next decade, Germany, Italy, and 
Japan will experience a decline in their working-
age population. The decline by 5 percent in 
Germany implies an increase in the ICT intensity 
by 0.5 percentage points. 
The increase in ICT intensity is only half the story. 
If our proxy for automation and digitisation-
related investment would not eventually improve 
the TFP growth rate, this channel would not work 
in our simulation. For this reason, we include the 
ICT ratio in our model for TFP growth, creating 
a simultaneous system in which ICT spending 
responds to demographic change and TFP growth 
in turn depends on the ICT share in the capital 
stock. Our estimates for the effect of the ICT capital 
share on TFP growth are in the range between 1.1 to 
3.0, depending on the model specification and the 
estimation method (cf. section A1.2.1 for technical 
details). Our preferred model delivers a value of 1.3 
showing that an increase in the share of ICT in the 
aggregate capital stock by one percentage point 
lifts the average TFP growth rate by 1.3 percentage 
points per year. Although the positive effect of 
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simple economic reasoning points to the 
relevance of relaxed financing constraints for 
gross fixed capital formation in economies with a 
higher savings rate. These countries do not have 
to tap international capital markets for domestic 
investment purposes thus avoiding severe 
asymmetric information problems. Our empirical 
analysis provides estimates for the response TFP 
growth to a variation of the savings rate in a range 
between 0.003 and 0.06, depending on the model 
specification and the estimation method. The 
preferred model giving a coefficient of 0.01, i.e. 
an increase in the savings rate by 1 percentage 
point will improve the TFP growth rate by 0.01 
percentage points. Although the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero in the preferred 
model, the size of the feedback mechanism 
between demographic variables and TFP growth 
transmitted through the savings rate is small. 
Picking up the example from the last paragraph, 
we expect a net reduction in the savings rate of 
one percentage points over the next decade, giving 
rise to a total reduction in the growth rate of TFP 
in the size of 0.01, or less than one hundredth of a 
will increase by 3.5 percentage points, reducing 
the aggregate savings rate by 1.2 percentage points 
(applying exact numbers from Table A1.3); the net 
effect is one percentage point. 
Figure 5.4 shows that the net effect of the ageing 
process will reduce the aggregate savings rate over 
the coming decades. The USA will be less affected 
than the remaining countries because the expected 
ageing process there is not very pronounced. Our 
projections show a decrease in the savings rates 
due to ageing ranging from –1.8 percentage points 
in the USA to –4,4 percentage points in Spain. 
Similarly, to the indirect transmission of future 
developments in the working-age population 
through ICT intensity into TFP growth, we also 
allow for a transmission of movements in the 
dependency ratios through the savings rate into 
TFP growth. The motivation for this indirect 
channel is empirical evidence that the savings 
rate is a robust explanatory variable in growth 
regression using Bayesian model averaging 
methods (Danquah et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
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figure 5.4  Gross domestic saving
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between 19 and 22 percent for all countries. In 
the long run, we expect only moderate changes 
in the investment rate not exceeding 2.1 percent 
of GDP for all countries. Investment activity will 
be sluggish or declining in Japan, Spain and Italy.
The production function approach combines 
productivity trends with the development in the 
labour market and the accumulation of capital, 
and it produces a path for potential output.
Figure 5.7 presents the growth rate of potential 
output. Real output growth will be in a range 
between –0.2 and 1.6 percent annually. The higher 
end of this range will be achieved in the USA, 
France, Austria and Germany, as the demographic 
trends are more favorable in these groups. This is 
due to relatively high fertility rates in the USA and 
France, while Austria and Germany experience 
high immigration. The largest decline in output 
growth between 2018 and 2050 will be in Italy. This 
is a consequence of low expected TFP growth, the 
strong decline in the working-age population, and 
sluggish capital accumulation. The pessimistic 
percentage point. All in all, given the interaction 
within the system of simultaneous equations and 
the moderate continuation of the trend towards 
more open economies, the TFP growth rate will 
improve over the next few years reaching a peak 
around the middle of the next decade (Figure 
5.5). Japan, Italy, and Spain will then experience 
a period of decreasing TFP growth rates due to 
demographic headwinds. Overall, the situation 
will have improved with respect to the starting 
year of our simulation, but Spain and Italy will 
form a distinct group with TFP growth of 0.1 
and 0.3 percent per year, while the remaining 
countries – including the USA – will settle in the 
range between 0.7 percent and 1 percent per year. 
The development of gross fixed capital formation 
in Figure 5.6 shows pronounced and long 
cycles. These cycles follow the change in the 
labour volume and the rate of growth of labour 
productivity. This rule allows a rising capital 
labour ratio, but it stabilizes the capital output 
ratio. The European Commission applies the same 
method. The share of capital in GDP remains 
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figure 5.5  TFP trend
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figure 5.6  Gross fixed capital formation
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figure 5.7  Potential output
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capita will grow at a similar pace as in Austria, 
France and Germany, the difference owing to 
higher productivity growth (cf. Figure 5.5). Spain, 
as a country with comparatively low expected 
productivity growth, also stands out in Figure 5.8, 
with growth in GDP per capita converging towards 
+0.2 percent per year. 
5.4  The Relation Between Saving, 
Investment and the Current 
Account
The development of the net international 
investment position is a mirror image of past 
domestic savings and investment decisions. This 
variable measures the assets and liabilities of each 
country vis-à-vis the rest of the world including 
foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, 
other investments, financial derivatives and 
reserve assets. The development of the net 
international investment position over time 
is determined by the current account balance. 
outlook for Italy and, to a lesser extent, also 
for Spain appears to be influenced by weak 
TFP growth in these countries in the past. Our 
estimates extrapolate past performance, partially 
negating the favorable effects from the interaction 
of ageing with directed technological change. 
Dividing potential output by the total population 
gives a better and well-known measure for the 
expected change in welfare than potential output, 
which is often used in international comparisons. 
The total population also comprises persons who 
are not gainfully employed and thus responds to 
changes in the population structure, even if the 
head-count is constant. 
Figure 5.8 reveals the importance of adjustments 
in total factor productivity as a compensation 
to adverse demographic trends. For Italy we 
expect not only a reduction in real output starting 
around 2030 but also a decline in GDP per capita 
a few years later. Contrary to this development 
will be the situation in Japan, where GDP per 
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figure 5.8  Potential output per capita
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substantially but will in 2050 still accumulate 
foreign assets. The USA, as the country with the 
highest current account deficit in 2018, will reduce 
the deficit slightly until 2025. Values for the 
current account deficit around –4 percent of GDP 
over such a long period are likely to deteriorate 
the confidence of international investors and may 
enforce a more drastic correction. The production 
function approach, however, does not consider 
financial market expectations. Of the large 
European economies France appears to follow an 
unstable course over time. From the beginning its 
current account balance is negative, converging 
to –2.2 percent of GDP by 2050. Again, a change 
in the attitude of international investors may 
impose a correction of this expected trend. Japan 
and Spain follow a balanced growth path until the 
end of the simulation period, while Austria and 
Germany are expected to have comparatively large 
swings in their current future account surpluses. 
Countries with a history of current account 
surpluses are international net investors, while 
countries with current account deficits will be net 
international debtors. Consequently, countries 
with a balanced current account will accumulate 
neither international assets nor debt. The current 
account reflects the difference between aggregate 
savings and investment in an open economy. 
Because we have modelled the response of the 
savings ratio to demographic change and our 
aggregate investment ratio reflects changes in 
labour productivity induced by demographic 
movements, we are also able to present the 
expected development of the current account 
in Figure 5.9. Being a balance between savings 
and investment, the current account would 
immediately reflect misspecification in our model 
set-up by showing non-stable patterns. A view 
on Figure 5.9 shows that the current account 
indicates some instability in response to the 
ageing population, but the direction and extent 
remain in a reasonable range. Germany, as the 
country with the highest current account surplus 
in the starting period, will reduce this position 
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figure 5.9  Current account balance
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process thus potentially creating excess demand. 
Our empirical results show that both dependency 
ratios correlate positively with inflation rates, i.e. 
periods of high inflation tend to come together 
with periods showing high dependency ratios. 
Particularly, the youth dependency ratio appears 
to have an intensively positive relation to the 
inflation rate. The estimates for the response of the 
inflation rate to a change in the youth dependency 
ratio varies between 0.2 and 0.9, depending on the 
model specification and estimation method. Our 
preferred model picks the lowest estimate in this 
range, i.e. 0.2. This implies that an increase in the 
youth dependency ratio by 1 percentage point is 
associated with an upward shift in the inflation 
rate by 0.2 percentage points. The variation for 
the coefficient of the old age dependency ratio 
is smaller. Our estimates are in the range of 0.1 
to 0.5, depending on the model specification and 
estimation method. The preferred model again 
features the lowest estimate of 0.1 from this range. 
The interpretation of this coefficient is equivalent 
to the previous discussion. Our projections are 
shown in Figure 5.10 and show a rising inflationary 
5.5 Inflation
Conventional macroeconomic wisdom holds 
that inflation, by and large, is a monetary 
phenomenon. Over the past decades, monetary 
authorities in developed countries held inflation 
rates in check, partly by following inflation 
targets, partly by installing currency boards 
and partly by joining the European Monetary 
Union, with Germany providing a stable anchor 
currency. During the past two decades, annual 
average inflation rates were roughly in the range 
between 1 and 2 percent. Our empirical analysis 
builds on a model for inflation rates using the 
young and old dependency ratios as demographic 
indicators. This choice is based on recent work by 
Juselius – Takáts (2018), proving that in a sample 
of 22 advanced economies from 1870 to 2016 
the increase in the dependent population ratio 
(children, adolescents, young adults and retirees) 
tends to positively correlate with higher inflation 
rates. Their findings are consistent with the life-
cycle hypothesis as these groups tend to consume 
without fully participating in the production 
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figure 5.10  Consumer price inflation rate
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size of the working-age population on economic 
variables. We call this scenario the “TFP growth 
at constant population” scenario because in this 
case TFP growth does not respond to changes in 
the population. 
The second alternative scenario turns on the 
estimated response of TFP growth, ICT intensity, 
and the savings rate to demographic changes in our 
model and thus corresponds to the compounded 
results presented in the previous sections. We 
call this scenario the “TFP growth at projected 
population” scenario because in this case current 
demographic projections influence all endogenous 
variables. 
The comparison of the “TFP growth at constant 
population” scenario with the baseline in Table 5.1 
shows zeros only because both the baseline as well 
as the alternative feature the same TFP growth 
path by assumption. On the other hand, if we allow 
for indirect effects of demographic changes on the 
economy, Table 5.1 shows that the model generates 
either weakly negative (Germany, France), or 
a negative (Austria, Italy, Spain, and Japan), or 
a weakly positive (USA) effect of demographic 
change on TFP growth. The effect also varies over 
time because the population structure reverses its 
development over the years (cf. Figure 4.5). The 
decomposition shows that the expected net effect 
from changes in the quality of labour, induced ICT 
intensity, and the response of the savings ratio 
on TFP growth throughout European countries is 
either negligible or negative. 
Although the figures in Table 5.1 appear small, the 
impact on the level of GDP per capita is magnified 
by the effect of growth rate compounding, whereby 
small differences in growth rates generate large 
differences in the level of per capita income 
over a prolonged period. Table 5.2 repeats the 
comparison of our two alternative scenarios to the 
baseline at constant population and without TFP 
effects in the simultaneous system for per capita 
GDP in 2010 euros. We chose three years for this 
comparison because averaging a growing variable 
such as GDP per capita over, say, a decade does 
not yield a sensible quantity for comparisons. For 
example, the value of –1,002 € for Germany in 
2030 indicates that in the scenario “TFP growth at 
pressure resulting from the increasing share of 
elderly people (65+). While Japan appears to be 
able to escape the deflationary trap in the future, 
we still expect Japan to have the lowest inflation 
rate in our sample. Because the USA faces the 
slowest ageing process, the change in the US-
inflation rate will remain negligibly small, while 
all European countries see their inflation rates 
respond to demographic pressures from 2030 
onwards. 
5.6  Decomposing the Direct and 
Indirect Effects of Demographic 
Change 
The results presented up to now compounded 
the direct effects of expected changes in the size 
of the population with indirect effects operating 
through changes in the quality of labour and 
induced directed technical change. The direct 
effect operates through the amount of labour 
used in the production of goods and services, 
while indirect effects account for changes in the 
productivity of the labour force, directed technical 
change, and adjustments of the savings rate. 
In this section we disentangle the direct from the 
indirect effect by using our model to simulate 
the future economic development under the 
assumption of a constant population, i.e. we 
freeze the population at the level and structure 
of the year 2018. This corresponds to the last 
observed value for all countries in our sample. By 
freezing the population, we eliminate all indirect 
effects that work through induced changes in TFP 
growth, ICT intensity, and the savings rate. We 
are thus able to present a hypothetical scenario 
that mimics the assumption of a TFP growth 
path, which is independent of demographic 
developments. We call this scenario the baseline 
scenario and we will compare two alternative 
scenarios to this baseline. 
The first alternative scenario uses the current 
population forecasts for the simulation, but 
eliminates the response of TFP growth, the ICT 
intensity, and the savings rate to changes in the 
demographic development from the model. This 
scenario reveals the direct effect of the changing 
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tABLe 5.1   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP trend –  
TFP growth – Average annual percentage changes
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
ø 2018–2030 ø 2030–2040 ø 2040–2050
Deviation from baseline in percentage points
Austria
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population –0.10 –0.07 –0.09
France
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population –0.05 –0.04 0.01
Germany
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population –0.09 0.00 –0.03
Italy
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population –0.16 –0.24 –0.13
Spain
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population –0.14 –0.29 –0.18
Japan
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population –0.10 –0.29 –0.23
USA
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population 0.03 0.07 0.03
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018. 
Source: WIFO calculations. – Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018. The alternative  
scenario with „TFP-growth at constant population“ combines the projected population dynamics with TFP-growth  
from the baseline. This makes the direct effect of demographic change on productivity growth visible.  
The alternative scenario with „TFP-growth at projected population“ combines the projected population dynamics  
with TFP-growth under directed technical change. This makes the quality effect and the effect of labour-saving  
technical progress on productivity growth visible.
constant population” per capita GDP in the year 
2030 in Germany would be lower by 1,002 € if we 
only account for the reduced labour input in our 
model. If we allow for all direct and indirect effects 
of population ageing on the TFP growth, the 
decline in per capita GDP increases to –1,612 € in 
2030. In this “TFP growth at projected population” 
scenario, annual per capita GDP in Germany would 
be lower by 6,053 € in 2050. Countries with more 
pronounced losses in TFP growth also show more 
severe reductions in per capita GDP relative to the 
baseline; the most extreme case being Japan with 
an expected decrease of 12,423 € by 2050. 
Another interesting result from our decomposition 
in Table 5.2 are negative values for the USA under 
both scenarios. Given the favorable population 
dynamics in the USA one would have expected a 
higher per capita GDP level in the scenario based 
on the projected population as compared to the 
baseline under constant population; Table 5.1 
shows that US TFP growth responds positively 
to this impulse but Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 
show that total population growth in the USA 
is considerably higher than the increase in its 
working-age population. During the years 2020 
through 2035, the gap between both growth rates 
varies between 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points per 
year, giving rise to higher population dynamics 
relative to GDP growth, and consequently lower 
values for per capita GDP in the scenarios based 
on the projected population. The slightly better 
performance in terms of TFP growth corrects only 
part of the negative direct effect resulting from 
comparatively lower labour input. 
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tABLe 5.2   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP trend – 
Potential output per capita in 2010 Euro
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
2030 2040 2050
Deviation from baseline in €
Austria
constant population –1.099 –2.848 –5.044
projected population –1.821 –4.230 –7.219
France
constant population –1.004 –2.780 –4.149
projected population –1.332 –3.374 –4.785
Germany
constant population –1.002 –2.948 –5.029
projected population –1.612 –3.732 –6.053
Italy
constant population –117 –1.514 –3.567
projected population –968 –3.420 –6.077
Spain
constant population 15 –1.342 –3.525
projected population –723 –3.387 –6.565
Japan
constant population –1.937 –3.333 –7.037
projected population –2.759 –6.377 –12.423
USA
constant population –1.381 –3.024 –3.525
projected population –1.146 –2.222 –2.314
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018.   
Source: WIFO calculations. – Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018. The alternative  
scenario with „TFP-growth at constant population“ combines the projected population dynamics with TFP-growth  
from the baseline. This makes the direct effect of demographic change on productivity growth visible.  
The alternative scenario with „TFP-growth at projected population“ combines the projected population dynamics  
with TFP-growth under directed technical change. This makes the quality effect and the effect of labour-saving  
technical progress on productivity growth visible.
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nature of economic crises. The bottom line is that 
the assumption of rising participation rates and 
falling unemployment rates implies that potential 
and actual employees can offer the right mix of 
skills required to acquire or retain jobs, the implicit 
assumption being that their health, mobility, 
education and experience match demand. Our 
labour market projections closely follow the 
methodology of the Ageing Report published by 
the European Commission. The results of this 
methodology imply increasing employment rates, 
except in Germany and the USA.
Recent work on endogenous growth models 
suggests that investment in automation and 
digitisation may solve the problem of the reduced 
quantity and quality of labour due to population 
ageing. To account for this possibility, we consider 
the share of ICT capital goods and software in the 
total capital stock as a measure of automation and 
digitisation investment. Our empirical results 
confirm the negative impact of ageing on total 
factor productivity and the positive impact of 
future ageing on the incentive to invest in the 
quality of capital today.
The EU-Ageing Report sidesteps the interaction 
between ageing and directed technological 
change by assuming convergence of productivity 
growth rates among EU-member states. This is 
motivated by the idea that perfect capital and 
labour mobility should enforce convergence. Our 
results show significant heterogeneity across 
countries, thus exposing the forces working 
against convergence. The annual average growth 
of total factor productivity in Austria, France, 
Germany, Japan and the USA between 2018 and 
2050 should be in the range of 0.7 to 1.0 percent. 
This is roughly consistent with the assumptions 
Current demographic projections for large 
industrialized economies convey a clear picture 
with respect to the future size of the working-age 
population. In the next thirty years, the working-
age population is expected to decline in most 
industrialized countries. The changing size of the 
population will be accompanied by a shift in its 
age structure towards a more elderly working-age 
population.
A smaller working-age population does not 
necessarily entail fewer people employed. Rising 
labour market participation rates and falling 
unemployment rates may assuage the decline in 
the working-age population. The participation 
rates are indeed expected to increase in most large 
industrialized countries, continuing the trend 
observed over the past fifty years. The exceptions 
are Germany and the USA, where participation 
rates are expected to decline or stagnate. The 
trend is largely driven by increasing participation 
rates of women, increasing participation rates of 
elderly workers due to better health conditions, 
higher statutory retirement ages and the positive 
effect from higher educational attainment. 
The effect of higher participation rates is 
reinforced by lower unemployment rates. This 
positive employment effect is most pronounced in 
Spain and Italy. For these countries, the European 
Commission expects a gradual but significant 
decrease of the currently high unemployment 
rates in the future. Decreasing unemployment 
rates are consistent with increasing scarcity of 
labour implied by demographic projections. Labour 
demand forecasts are much less certain than 
projections of labour supply, as the former is more 
affected by patterns in the international division 
of labour (globalisation) and the unpredictable 
6 Conclusions
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inflation rates in the range of 1.1 (Japan) to 3.7 
(Spain) percent. Our projections show that over 
the next three decades Japan will continue to 
experience lower inflation rates compared to other 
industrialized countries.
Population ageing slows the growth of working-
age population and thus has a direct negative 
effect on output growth. Projections based on 
directed technical change suggest that technical 
progress is unlikely to fully offset the additional 
negative effect of demographic trends on the 
growth of total factor productivity. One reason 
for this is that our estimates produce relatively 
conservative projections for the ICT intensity – 
the factor that is supposed to offset the combined 
negative effect of ageing on the quantity (labour 
input in hours) and quality (productivity) of labour 
through automation and digitisation. The increase 
in the share of ICT and software will slacken in the 
next five years. The ICT intensity must continue to 
increase to have a permanent effect on productivity 
growth. To balance the negative ageing effect on 
TFP growth over the next three decades (quality 
effect), the share of ICT capital and software in 
capital stock would have to increase by a factor of 
2.5 to 3.5 in Italy, Japan and Spain, and by roughly 
1.5 in Austria, France and Germany. In order to 
compensate for both, the direct (quantity) and 
the indirect (quality) effects of ageing, the share 
of ICT capital and software in the capital stock 
would have to increase by a factor of roughly 4.5 
to 5.5 in Italy, Japan and Spain, and by 2.0 to 3.0 in 
Austria, France and Germany. We conjecture that 
relying on data from 1980 onwards, our results 
implicitly lean heavily on the experiences of the 
past two decades, which have been exceptional 
in several respects. The ICT revolution that began 
in the 1990s has largely come to a halt, while 
a severe global financial and economic crisis 
has left a long-lasting scar on many economies, 
especially southern European economies have 
subsequently experienced a sovereign debt crisis. 
Extrapolating the recent experience may lead to 
overly pessimistic projections. As a final caveat, 
we would like to emphasise that our analysis 
focuses on a facet of the complex interplay between 
demography, technology and growth. Although 
our projections try to account for simultaneity 
between the determinants of technical progress, 
of the European Commission. Yet, the growth 
of total factor productivity in Spain and Italy 
should be considerably smaller, ranging from 0.1 
percent in the case of Italy to 0.3 percent in Spain. 
Whether capital and labour mobility in the EU 
would diminish these differences remains an open 
question, but the experience in the aftermath of 
the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 
refutes convergence.
The accumulation of physical capital depends on 
prospects for the future and the means of today. 
Projections show a decrease in the savings rates 
in percent of GDP due to ageing in all countries, 
ranging from –1.8 percentage points in the USA to 
–4.4 percentage points in Spain. In the long run, 
capital accumulation should adjust to productivity 
growth, stabilizing the capital-to-output ratio. We 
expect only moderate changes in the investment-
to-output ratio, with investment activity being 
weakest in Japan, Italy and Spain.
The trend of total factor productivity coupled with 
trends in the labour market and the adjustment 
in capital accumulation result in annual average 
growth rates of real output between –0.2 in Italy 
and 1.6 percent in the USA. The higher growth 
rates are expected in the USA, France, Austria and 
Germany, as the demographic trends are least 
obstructive to growth in these countries. This is 
due to comparatively high fertility rates in the 
USA and France, and to migration in the case of 
Austria and Germany. Compared to the period 
between 2000 and 2018, economic growth is likely 
to slow down in most countries considered in this 
study, with the difference being largest for Italy 
and Spain.
Conventional macroeconomic wisdom holds that 
inflation, by and large, is a monetary phenomenon. 
During the past decades, monetary authorities in 
developed countries were able to hold inflation 
in check, despite rising structural pressures due 
to ageing. From 2000 to 2018, annual average 
inflation rates were between 1 and 2 percent – 
except in Japan, which has experienced an average 
negative inflation rate (deflation). Our projections 
show rising inflationary pressures that are due to 
the increasing share of economically dependent 
persons in the population, with average annual 
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savings and capital accumulation, our analysis 
remains fragmentary against the backdrop of the 
vast complexity of the studied phenomena.
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The long-term projections underlying the EC-
Ageing Reports (t+30) typically assume a gradual 
convergence of country-specific trend estimates 
towards common values.
This appendix is structured as follows. The next 
section summarises the EC methodology for 
estimating potential output (Section A1.1). Section 
A1.2 presents estimates based on longitudinal 
(panel) data, which are then used to extend the 
projection methodology of the EC. This is followed 
by a section summarising the extended projection 
methodology (Section A1.3). The final section 
describes data sources (Section A1.4).
A1.1  The Production Function 
Methodology
The output gap as the relative deviation of real 
GDP from potential output indicates the cyclical 
position of an economy. Gauging the current 
cyclical position is important for economic 
forecasting and for formulating economic policy. 
The potential output is defined as the level of 
output compatible with stable (wage) inflation. 
As a key indicator of inflationary pressures, the 
output gap is highly relevant for monetary policy. 
Estimates of the output gap also guide fiscal 
policy, whose aim is to mitigate the effect of 
business cycles on incomes, while ensuring the 
sustainability of public finances in the medium 
term. Finally, and most relevant to this study, the 
change in potential output describes the long-run 
growth path of an economy, laying a foundation 
for long-term macroeconomic projections and 
scenarios.
This technical appendix details the theoretical 
and empirical methodology used in the recent 
Ageing Report of the European Commission (EC) 
and the extensions of this methodology pursued 
in this study. The principal aim of this study 
is to account for the interplay of demographic 
factors and technical progress, and to extend 
the EC methodology that assumes an exogenous 
technical progress. The second aim is to discuss 
the consequences of demographic trends for key 
macroeconomic quantities, such as the change in 
the consumer price index and the ratios of savings, 
investment, and the current account to output.
The EC methodology views potential output as a 
trend around which the actual output fluctuates 
over the course of a business cycle. This trend 
describes the output trajectory of an economy in 
the medium and long term. The EC uses extensions 
of short-term forecasts for fiscal planning up to 
t+10 and for assessments of the budgetary impact 
of the ageing population till 2070. Short-term 
forecasts are published twice a year. The spring 
forecast covers the current and next year (t+1), 
whereas the autumn forecast updates the spring 
forecast and extends it by an additional year (t+2). 
The medium-term forecast extends the short-
term forecast by three more years (t+3 through 
t+5, currently until 2023). The medium-term 
forecast essentially describes the transition from 
short-term business cycle fluctuations to a long-
term steady-state growth driven independently 
by demographic developments and technical 
progress. The output gap is assumed to close at the 
end of the medium-term horizon (t+5), and the 
unemployment rate converges to an equilibrium 
unemployment rate, which is determined by 
labour market institutions, as well as several non-
structural factors and persistent cyclical factors. 
A1  the extended Production function 
methodology
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utilization, so that a positive output gap indicates 
overutilization and rising inflationary pressure, 
which should ease once the capacity converges to 
normal levels. To identify the average utilization 
of labour, we first decompose total hours worked:
where POPt denotes the population aged between 
15 and 64 (working-age population), PRTt the 
participation rate in percent of the working-age 
population, Ut the unemployment rate, and Ht 
are hours worked per person gainfully employed, 
i.e. employees and self-employed. The above 
definition uses the identity LSt ∙ (1–Ut) = LDt, 
involving the labour supply LSt, the number 
of persons gainfully employed LDt, and the 
unemployment rate Ut. Then,
where LSt/POPt represents PRTt and 
Lt/LDt
 
represents Ht.
The output gap is defined as the relative deviation 
of real GDP from the potential output, Yt:
The business cycle influences the current total 
factor productivity TFPt, the participation rate in 
percent of the working-age population PRTt, the 
unemployment rate Ut and the hours worked per 
person employed Ht, while the trend components, 
indicated by an upper bar, depend on structural 
factors. We can decompose each of these series 
into a trend and cyclical component, the latter 
being removed when computing potential output.
The contributions of labour and capital to the 
growth of potential output are defined as follows:
The output gap as a deviation from a long-run trend 
is a common element of many macroeconomic 
models today. An early example of contemporary 
formalism is the paper by Perloff – Wachter 
(1979), whose ideas were further developed by 
the IMF and the OECD in the late 1980s. Since the 
1990s these institutions have published estimates 
of potential output and output gaps as a part of 
their macroeconomic forecasts. The output gap is 
the central concept in the New Keynesian theory, 
where it enters the New Keynesian Economics 
Phillips curve and the Taylor Rule governing the 
monetary policy (Clarida et al., 1999).
The EC uses a production function methodology 
to estimate potential output for the EU Member 
States and the USA3. In this study we will 
concentrate on the big economies of the euro 
area and Austria, as well as the USA and Japan. 
The estimates of potential output are based on a 
sample of historical data extended by the short-
term (t+2) forecast from spring 2019.
The point of departure is an aggregate production 
function that describes the current level of actual 
real GDP (chain-linked volumes at 2010 reference 
levels). The production function models real GDP, 
Yt, using a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
with capital stock (Kt) and total hours worked (Lt) 
as factor inputs:
The observed total factor productivity (TFPt) 
represents the part of the actual output which 
cannot be explained by labour and capital inputs. 
The growth rate of the observed total factor 
productivity is usually called the Solow Residual, 
or the part of growth in real GDP that is not 
explained by changes in labour and capital used 
in production.
Potential output is defined as the level of output 
associated with constant (wage) inflation. The 
output gap as the relative deviation of real GDP 
from trend output describes the aggregate capacity 
3 The methodology is constantly being updated and 
improved. This conceptual work is carried out by the 
Output Gap Working Group (OGWG) in cooperation with 
the EU member states. For a detailed exposition, see 
Havik et al. (2014).
Yt = TFPt ∙ Lta ∙ Kt1–a, where α e (0,1). (A1)
LT = POPt ∙    
LSt    ∙ (1–Ut ) ∙   
Lt   , (A3)
POPt                    LDt
GAPt = 100 ∙   (A4)  Yt
 Yt – Yt 
Lt = POPt ∙ PRTt ∙ (1 – Ut) ∙ Ht , (A2)
Lt– Lt–1lt = 100 ∙ α (               ) where 
Lt = POPt ∙ PRTt (1 – vt ) ∙ Ht. (A5)
Lt–1
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A1.1.2   Unobserved Component Model
The trend in total factor productivity and the 
natural rate of unemployment (NAWRU) are 
estimated using unobserved component models. 
The following example of a simple unobserved 
component model splits the main observable 
variable into a trend and a cycle. The cycle is 
assumed to be influenced by another observable 
variable. This adds a second measurement 
equation to the system. The model can include 
exogenous variables.
Consider a simple unobserved component model:
The first measurement equation decomposes the 
observed variable Xt in an unobserved trend τt 
and an unobserved cycle ct. The trend is a simple 
(Gaussian) random walk with drift that fluctuates 
around a deterministic linear trend with the slope 
μ. This specification implies an I(1) process for 
the trend. The cycle is an AR(1) process with a 
(Gaussian) white noise error. The cycle feeds into 
an observable cyclical variable Φt. All error terms, 
atp, atc, and atcu, are assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed, but their distributional 
parameters can differ in the cross section. In the 
case of the TFP trend, Xt = log (TFPt) is the observed 
total factor productivity and Φt is the rate of 
capacity utilization. In the case of the NAWRU, Xt is 
the actual unemployment rate and Φt is the change 
in wage inflation (Phillips curve). Since the cycle 
feeds into an observable variable Φt, the above 
system has two measurement equations (A8a, A8d) 
and two state equations (A8b and A8c). A Phillips 
curve typically features exogenous determinants 
of price or wage inflation as independent variables 
– for example, the change in terms of trade, labour 
productivity and labour share.
Remark (Random Walk): The implementation 
used by the EC allows three specifications for the 
Here vt denotes the natural rate of unemployment 
(NAWRU), or the trend unemployment rate. The 
contribution of TFP to the growth of potential 
output, gt, is computed as a remainder:
A1.1.1  Participation Rate and Average 
Hours-Worked
Labour force participation rates experience 
moderate business cycle fluctuations. The degree 
of cyclicality of participation rates is not uniform 
for all cohorts. For instance, womens‘ and older 
workers‘ labour market participation tends to 
react differently than that of prime-age male 
workers. Social and economic background can 
also play a role. Labour force participation rates 
have only recently recovered following a decrease 
after the Great Recession. Estimates for the US 
labour market suggest that cyclical fluctuations 
of aggregate participation rates may have become 
more pronounced (van Zandweghe, 2017).
The average hours-worked have traditionally been 
subject to pronounced business cycle fluctuations. 
Significant hiring and firing costs make adjusting 
hours worked („intensive margin“) preferable 
to adjusting employment („extensive margin“). 
Empirical evidence shows that working hours 
have become more volatile over time, with marked 
differences between the Western European labour 
markets and the US labour market (Ohanian – 
Raffo, 2011).
Cyclical fluctuations of the participation rate and 
the average working hours must be removed when 
computing potential output. The EC methodology 
follows a pragmatic approach by applying the 
Hodrick – Prescott (1997) (HP) filter. The value 
of the smoothing parameter (λ = 10) follows the 
recommendations for annual data in Baxter – 
King (1999). This value is higher than the 6.25 
advocated for annual real GDP by Ravn – Uhlig 
(2002).
kt = 100 ∙ (1 – α)(               ). (A6)
Kt – Kt–1
Kt–1
ft = gt – lt – kt where gt = 100 ∙ (               ) (A7)
Yt – Yt–1
Yt–1
Xt = τt + ct ,  (A8a)
∆τt = μ + at
p ~ N(0,σ2 ) trend, (A8b),
ct = w1 ct–1 + at
c
Φt = μcu + βct + at
cu ~ N(0,σ2 ) cycle (A8c, A8d)acu
ap
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where log(ELta ∙ EKt1–a) represents τt and 
log(ULta ∙ UKt1–a) represents ct.
Neither of the two components can be observed. 
Identifying the trend τt thus requires removing 
cyclical fluctuations in the two input factors Lt 
and Kt given by ct. The cycle ct is identified using 
the variations in the rate of capacity utilization 
sourced from business sentiment surveys. 
A1.1.4   Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of 
Unemployment (NAWRU).
The trend of the unemployment rate is defined as 
the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment 
(NAWRU), the dominant macroeconomic 
equilibrium concept for the labour market 
(Layard et al., 2005). The existing approaches 
for modelling the NAWRU and its companion 
concept of the non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment (NAIRU) come in many flavours. 
Structural specifications of a Phillips curve view 
inflation as a function of discounted expected 
future marginal costs, where unobservable 
marginal costs are approximated by the labour 
share. Purely structural models often incorporate 
price and wage stickiness characteristic of the 
New Keynesian paradigm (Schorfheide, 2008). The 
NAWRU follows from a set of structural equations 
under the assumption that the labour market is 
in a long-term equilibrium. The second group of 
methods estimates the NAWRU directly using a 
variety of statistical techniques for decomposing 
the unemployment rate into a cycle and a trend. 
The EC methodology follows a midway between 
purely structural and purely reduced-form models. 
It allows the NAWRU to be estimated based on a 
Phillips curve, while also retaining flexibility by 
assuming that it follows a random walk (Gordon, 
1997). This approach has the advantage that an 
equilibrium unemployment rate can be determined 
directly by imposing the condition of stable wage 
inflation (Hristov et al., 2017).
The Phillips curve postulates a negative 
relationship between wage inflation and the 
unemployment gap. An actual unemployment 
rate above the NAWRU puts a downward pressure 
on the rate of growth of nominal wages. The 
opposite is the case if the unemployment rate 
unobserved trend (A8b). These are a random walk 
with a constant drift, a second-order (nested) 
random walk, and a random walk whose drift 
follows a stationary AR(1) process, respectively. 
The first and third option implies that the trend 
follows an I(1) process, i.e. it becomes stationary 
after first differencing. A second-order random 
walk results in an I(2) trend. The EC estimates a 
random walk with an AR(1) drift for all countries 
under consideration in this study, which is 
important for the empirical modelling choices 
of Section A1.2, where we extend the exogenous 
trend model of the EC using panel-econometric 
estimates.
Remark (Bayesian Estimation): An unobserved 
component model can be estimated using the 
method of Maximum Likelihood or using Bayesian 
techniques. The EC uses a Bayesian estimate for the 
TFP trend and a Maximum Likelihood estimate for 
the NAWRU (Planas – Rossi, 2018). The Maximum 
Likelihood variant of the EC implementation can 
be applied to a richer set of models. The main 
advantage of using Bayesian techniques is that the 
bounds imposed on the various parameters of the 
model in the Maximum Likelihood estimation can 
be relaxed using prior distributions, effectively 
eliminating any boundary solutions for the 
estimates. On the other hand, the error bands for 
the productivity trend cannot be transferred to the 
estimate of potential output, negating the main 
benefit of a Bayesian approach.
A1.1.3   Trend of Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP)
The Cobb-Douglas functional form for the 
production function (A1) entails the equivalence 
of the Hicks-neutral and factor-augmenting 
technical change. This implies that the observed 
total factor productivity TFPt conflates the 
efficiency in the use of the two inputs (ELt, EKt) 
with the degree of their utilization (ULt, UKt)
or, taking the natural logarithms,
TFPt = ELt
a ∙ EKt
1–a ∙ ULt
a ∙ UKt
1–a, (A9)
log(TFPt) = log(ELt
a ∙ EKt
1–a) + log(ULt
a ∙ UKt
1–a), (A10)
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The prevalence of technological trends and 
macroeconomic cycles common to a group of 
countries makes panel data the preferred 
choice for an empirical inquiry of the economic 
consequences of demographic trends. Panel data 
convey time-variation in individual countries 
and cross-sectional variation. The existence of 
common trends and cycles induces inter-temporal 
and cross-sectional dependencies in model 
disturbances, which must be accounted for either 
explicitly or by using robust inference.
All model specifications include country-fixed 
effects to capture heterogeneity between countries 
that is not accounted for by the explanatory 
variables. In addition, some specifications also 
feature time effects, which help explain common 
time variation in the dependent variable that is not 
fully accounted for by the explanatory variables. 
The inclusion of fixed effects in empirical work is 
very common, where they serve as a kind of catch-
all for factors that might affect the dependent 
variable but have been left out in the specification, 
and sometimes also for checking the robustness 
of the explanatory variables in explaining the 
variation of the dependent variable.
To obtain more representative estimates, the main 
group of countries under consideration (Austria, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, USA) is 
extended by including the following European 
Union member countries: Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. The estimation sample thus covers 
thirteen mature, advanced and not-too-small 
economies on an annual basis between 1980 and 
2015. The following four sections present the 
models and estimates for the growth rate of the 
TFP trend, the change in the share of ICT capital 
in the capital stock, the aggregate rate of saving, 
and the consumer price inflation, respectively. 
For these variables we expect a direct relation 
to demographic developments, the remaining 
variables react indirectly, or they are exogenously 
given. If possible, we draw on values of the 
exogenous variables as published by the European 
Commission (2018). 
To get an impression of how robust the estimates 
are to the choice of the model specification 
falls below the NAWRU. The other key variables 
include labour productivity and marginal costs 
approximated by the labour share. The terms of 
trade may play a role if the wage setters target 
the GDP inflation rather than consumer price 
inflation, or when the export sector dominates the 
outcomes of wage bargaining (Galí – Gertler, 1999). 
The Phillips curve thus captures the short-term 
variation of nominal wage inflation to changes in 
labour productivity, aggregate marginal costs and 
the employment gap represented by the cyclical 
component of the actual unemployment rate.
A1.1.5 Capital Stock
The capital stock describes the available inventory 
of gross fixed assets. The capital stock is 
accumulated using a perpetual inventory method. 
The EC methodology does not model capital 
utilization directly; formally, Kt = Kt. Any cyclical 
fluctuation in capital utilization is assumed to be 
removed by the cyclical adjustment of the total 
factor productivity in the decomposition (A9).
A1.2 Extensions Using Panel Data
The hypothesis of directed technological change 
implies that the implementation of labour-
saving technical change is not exogenously given, 
rather it is related to either the age structure 
of the working-age population (Acemoglu – 
Restrepo, 2019A) or the expected change in the 
size of the working-age population (Abeliansky – 
Prettner, 2017). Earlier work by Skirbekk (2004) 
points towards a negative impact of ageing on 
TFP growth resulting from hump-shaped life-
cycle productivity profiles. These hypotheses 
motivate our departure from the EC-approach 
of country-specific TFP growth, which converges 
to a common value of 1 percent per year (cf. 
Table 2.5). We will use the relation between trend 
total factor productivity growth and demographic 
measures, an indicator of automation relying 
on ICT investment, and other variables often 
shown to drive long-term growth in output, in 
a series of panel data regressions. For the other 
macroeconomic variables of interest, we will 
use the same approach to create endogenous 
responses to demographic variations. 
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The scarcity effect, on the other hand, should 
induce automation and thus work only indirectly 
through the improved structure of physical 
investments. The structural effect is represented 
by the ratio of the share of older (55–64) to middle-
aged (25–54) workers, cf. Acemoglu – Restrepo 
(2019A). We capture the scarcity effect by the 
change in the Information and Communication 
Technology and software intensity of the 
capital stock (ICT), our proxy for labour-saving 
automation (Brynjolfsson – Hitt, 2000; Basu et 
al., 2001). Our definition of ICT includes software 
in addition to information and communication 
equipment. This is important since software as 
a means of production plays a crucial role in the 
process of automation and digitisation of business 
processes (van Ark, 2016). The ICT intensity is 
given by the share of ICT equipment and software 
in the total capital stock. The change in the 
ICT intensity of the capital stock is related to 
ICT investment, which tends to be volatile and 
procyclical like most investment expenditures. We 
therefore smooth the ICT intensity using an HP-
Filter with smoothing parameter (λ = 10) to remove 
excessive fluctuations that are predominantly 
related to the business cycle.
In view of Danquah et al. (2011), we select the 
savings rate, trade openness and country-fixed 
effects as additional explanatory variables. The 
more an economy saves, the more it can invest. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that more open 
economies feature higher levels of competition 
on domestic markets, and they have better access 
to new technology. Some of this technology 
is embodied in the goods traded, but other 
transmission channels via trade in services and 
foreign direct investment can also be important. 
Danquah et al. (2011), however, find that openness 
is negatively correlated with technical progress, 
surmising that openness is important in the 
catching-up phase of economic development, 
but becomes detrimental once the economy nears 
the technological frontier4. Even though some 
of our models corroborate the negative effect of 
openness, we find the sign of the effect implausible 
and the explanation rather unconvincing. It is 
reasonable to assume that rising openness ceases 
4 Although, they find openness to be positively correlated 
with changes in economic efficiency.
and the estimation method, we present several 
approaches for each variable. We select across 
the models for the long-term projections by 
using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
The BIC is a popular model selection criterion 
that accounts for the variance of errors and the 
number of model parameters. When choosing 
between two models, the one with the lowest BIC 
is preferred. This measure penalizes overfitting 
by preferring a simpler model to a more complex 
model, unless the residual sum of squares of the 
more complex model is much smaller. Therefore, 
introducing time-fixed effects into a model does 
not necessarily produce a better model according 
to the BIC-criterion. 
A1.2.1   Trend growth in Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP)
Let us begin with a few remarks on the dependent 
variable, the annual growth rate of trend TFP 
obtained using the unobserved component models 
by the EC. In Section A1.1.2, we already emphasized 
the stationarity of these growth rates. Secondly, 
contrary to most existing empirical studies, the 
use of trend estimates allows us to use the full 
set of annual observations rather than using 
time averages as a crude (but effective) means of 
getting rid of business cycles. The growth rates of 
actual TFP are strongly procyclical, whereas the 
growth rates of trend TFP should be free of cyclical 
fluctuations. The EC estimates of potential output, 
and similar estimates by other institutions, 
typically still include some cyclical fluctuations. 
The critique of excessive procyclicality of potential 
output estimates is frequently voiced in their 
evaluations (EU IFIs, 2018). For this reason, we 
control for the business cycle by adding the output 
gap to the regression model.
Turning to the empirical determinants of TFP 
growth, we begin with a general remark on 
demographic variables. In general, we seek to 
disentangle the scarcity effect related to the size 
of the labour force from the quality effect related 
to the change in its age structure. In the case of 
productivity growth, the quality effect is negative, 
as an older labour force is expected to be less 
productive. 
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Most estimates confirm significant negative 
effects of age-structure and positive effects of 
the ICT intensity. Being a ratio of shares, our 
age structure variable is unit-free. A negative 
coefficient of α implies that a unit change in the 
ratio of old to middle-aged workers decreases 
the growth of TFP trend by α percentage points. 
The negative sign confirms the dampening effect 
of bigger cohorts entering the age group of 55 
through 65 years resulting from the hump-shaped 
lifetime productivity profile. The inclusion of 
time-fixed effects tends to make the effect of the 
ageing variable smaller. The growth of TFP trend 
increases by β percentage points following an 
increase in the ICT intensity by one percent. The 
positive sign of the coefficient for ICT intensity, on 
the other hand, confirms the indirect productivity 
enhancement from ageing, associated with 
the shift in the population age structure from 
middle-aged towards elderly workers. In most 
specifications, the effects of the output gap 
and the savings rate have the expected positive 
sign. Several specifications return a negative 
and statistically significant effect of openness, 
corroborating the conclusions reached in Danquah 
et al. (2011). This effect disappears when time-
fixed effects enter the model.
The BIC identifies FGLS without time-fixed effects 
as the best fit. Since this specification returns an 
implausible sign on the openness variable, we 
deviate from the best-fit principle and choose the 
FGLS with time-fixed effects instead. This model 
has the lower BIC of the two models with time-
fixed effects. The analysis of country-specific 
regressions shows that Spain may be an outlier, 
nevertheless, eliminating Spain from the panel 
leaves the estimates almost unchanged.
to increase the spread of technology once a certain 
level of development has been attained. Figure 
A1.1 shows the history for the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP and the forecast resulting from 
a univariate exponential smoothing method (cf. 
section A1.3.1). The forecasts show a moderate 
increase in openness over the next decades with 
the USA, Italy, and Japan converging quickly to 
stable values. The negative effect of openness is 
also at odds with other empirical findings, e.g. 
Miller – Upadhyay, 2000. The effect of initial GDP 
is relevant for developing economies, where it 
can contribute to explaining high rates of growth 
during a catching-up process. In our models this 
effect is subsumed in the country-fixed effect.
Table A1.1 presents these sets of estimates, 
separately for the age structure and the change 
in the ICT intensity, and for the full model that 
includes all explanatory variables. The estimates 
of all other models will be presented in this way. 
The first two columns show fixed-effect (FE) 
estimates with Driscoll – Kraay (1998) standard 
errors. These standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-
sectional correlation. The use of robust standard 
errors is justified by the three tests that assert 
the presence of serial correlation and cross-
sectional dependence. These tests are: Pesaran 
(2004) parametric testing procedure for cross-
sectional dependence, Wooldridge (2002) test 
for serial correlation, and a (modified) Wald 
heteroskedasticity test. They reveal significant 
serial correlation and cross-sectional correlation 
in disturbances. Based on these tests, we reject 
FE in favour of Feasible Generalised Least Squares 
(FGLS) and Prais-Winsten (PW), as likely more 
efficient and more robust alternatives. This also 
better reflects the structure of our panel (small N 
and large T) in comparison to what is assumed by 
the asymptotic properties of the FE-estimator. 
The FGLS estimate (shown in columns 3 through 
5) assumes general cross-sectional dependence 
and country-specific first-order autocorrelation. 
Beck – Katz (1995) have shown that FGLS standard 
errors can be too optimistic (anticonservative) in 
small to medium-sized panels. They recommend 
using the PW regression instead, for which results 
are shown in columns 6 through 8 of Table A1.1.
59
the exteNDeD ProDuCtioN fuNCtioN methoDoLogy
A
s 
a 
p
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f G
D
P
 
USAJapan Spain
ItalyGermanyFranceAustria
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
205020452040203520302025202020152010200520001995199019851980
Source: European Commission, WIFO calculations.
figure A1.1  Exports and imports (openness)
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figure A1.2  USA: ICT price index
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the expected growth by one percentage point 
increases the ICT share by α percent. The estimates 
imply that an anticipated future labour shortage 
should spur investment in automation and, in 
combination with our model for TFP growth, 
strengthen productivity today. The size of the 
coefficient on the ageing indicator in the FGLS 
and the PW models varies between –0.1 and 
–0.4, depending on the number of explanatory 
variables, the inclusion of time-fixed effects and 
the estimation method. Our preferred choice 
according to the BIC criterion of goodness of 
fit is the FGLS regression including time-fixed 
effects. The coefficient on the output gap tends to 
be positive, but it is not statistically significantly 
different from zero. The negative coefficient on 
the ICT price is statistically significant, showing 
the importance of declining ICT prices on the ICT 
investment and consequently the ICT intensity of 
the capital stock. 
A1.2.2   Share of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT)
The second set of regressions models the change in 
the ICT intensity of the capital stock. Investment 
is a forward-looking activity aimed at changing 
production capacity and improving future 
productivity. This suggests the use of expected 
rather than current demographic indicators. 
Table A1.2 reports the estimates. As an additional 
variable we include the output gap as a measure of 
the cyclical position and the deflator of ICT capital 
as the relevant price (Jorgenson – Stiroh, 2000; 
Gust – Marquez, 2004). 
The FGLS and the PW models are estimated with 
or without time-fixed effects. Including time 
effects is reasonable in view of the pronounced 
upward trend in ICT intensity observed in the 
past. A negative coefficient of α on the expected 
population growth tells us that a decrease in 
tABLe A1.1  Trend growth of total factor productivity (TFP)
F.E.1 F.E.1 FGLS FGLS FGLS PW PW PW
Ageing indicators
Ratio of old to 
middle-aged 
workers
–0.0994 *** –0.0485 *** –0.0481 *** –0.0588 *** –0.0200 *** –0.0549 *** –0.0621 *** –0.0225 *
(–8.13) (–5.49) (–12.69) (–18.93) (–4.93) (–5.28) (–6.88) (–1.97)
Macroeconomic indicators
Change in ICT 
intensity
2.6 ** 3.0 *** 1.1 *** 1.4 *** 1.3 *** 1.7 * 1.4 * 1.6
(2.85) (4.61) (4.00) (5.75) (4.41) (2.14) (2.13) (1.92)
Output gap
–0.0263 0.0138 *** 0.00482 * 0.0116 * 0.00357
(–1.84) (5.84) (2.04) (2.01) (0.58)
Trade openness
–0.0246 *** –0.00344 *** 0.000306 –0.00571 ** 0.000923
(–10.18) (–4.98) (0.57) (–3.21) (0.49)
Savings rate
0.0637 *** 0.00253 0.0108 *** 0.0107 0.0125
(7.50) (0.78) (3.82) (1.22) (1.46)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies no no no no yes no no yes
H0: Cross-
sectional 
independence 
17.5 *** 4.9 ***
H0: Absence of 
serial correlation
13087.1 *** 12848.5 ***
H0: Groupwise 
hemogeneity
13504.2 *** 708.4 ***
BIC 3213 3490 3459 3654
Years 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
1 Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent level of significance.
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is most pronounced over the life-cycle because 
children, adolescents and young adults typically 
cannot save, as they have no income. Similarly, 
retirees will have to finance their consumption 
expenditures through public pensions and 
annuities paid out from occupational or private 
capital-based pension systems. 
A similar smoothing effect can be expected with 
respect to income fluctuations associated with the 
business cycle. Private households have means 
for spending in times of economic upturns, but 
also an incentive to save for economically less 
fortunate times. On the other hand, they will 
draw from their reserves during a downturn when 
income from bonus payments and overtime hours 
is curtailed or during episodes of unemployment. 
Our empirical model therefore features the current 
young dependency ratio and the old dependency 
ratio as demographic indicators. They are defined 
as the share of individuals aged between 0 and 
24, and those 65 or older in the total population, 
respectively. We prefer two separate measures 
because the savings behaviour of families with 
kids may deviate from the behaviour of retirees. 
A1.2.3  Aggregate Saving
Aggregate saving comprises the savings of private 
households, the savings of enterprises, the savings 
of the general government (budget balance), and 
the savings of the foreign sector (current account 
balance). All four types of saving have their own 
quite diverse determinants, which we will briefly 
discuss in the following.
We can identify three main motives for private 
households to save: for retirement and bequests, 
for large expenses (e.g., housing, education) and as 
a precaution for economically bad times. The main 
theoretical explanation for a relationship between 
age and saving is the life-cycle hypothesis. This 
hypothesis aims at explaining the consumption 
and saving behaviour of a private household over 
the life-span of an individual. It assumes that 
the members of a household prefer to maintain 
a stable lifestyle over time. To achieve this, they 
smooth their consumption by saving during 
periods of high economic activity and dissaving 
during periods without income from economic 
activity (Browning – Crossley, 2001). This pattern 
tABLe A1.2  Change in share of information and communication technologies (ICT)
F.E.1 F.E.1 FGLS FGLS FGLS PW PW PW
Ageing indicators
Expected growth 
of working-age 
population
–1.2 *** –0.1 ** –0.3 *** –0.2 *** –0.1 *** –0.4 *** –0.2 *** –0.1 *
(–7.66) (–2.78) (–30.54) (–34.45) (–22.46) (–4.32) (–4.31) (–2.53)
Macroeconomic indicators
Output gap
–0.0102 0.000642 0.000278 0.000953 0.000982
(–1.44) (1.92) (1.25) (0.32) (0.57)
US deflator of 
ICT-capital
–0.00771 *** –0.00689 *** –0.00857 *** –0.00684 *** 0.00380 ***
(–37.87) (–161.07) (–372.21) (–13.22) (7.36)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies no no no no yes no no yes
H0: Cross-
sectional 
independence 
38.8 *** 2.1 **
H0: Absence of 
serial correlation
14855.7 *** 308.4 ***
H0: Groupwise 
hemogeneity
1340.4 *** 549.5 ***
BIC 3530 2207 3276 3536
Years 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
1 Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent level of significance.
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Finally, government deficits generally tend to be 
procyclical (Lane, 2003; Alesina et al., 2008) and 
strongly depend on the political system as well 
as financing constraints building up in times of 
financial distress.
Table A1.3 presents the estimates. In all 
specifications we see the expected negative effect 
of demographic dependency ratios, whereby both 
the share of young and the share of retirees in 
total population reduce aggregate saving. Since 
dependency ratios are unit-free, their coefficients 
convey the effect of a unit change on aggregate 
savings rate in percent. The negative coefficients 
on the young dependency ratio show that savings 
decrease when families have more kids. The effect 
of a rising old dependency ratio is stronger, but not 
always statistically significant. This may suggest 
that retired households do not dissave to the 
extent implied by the life-cycle model (Url – 
Wüger, 2005), as is shown by Börsch-Suppan et al. 
(2001) for Germany. The output gap has a positive 
effect, showing that saving tends to be procyclical 
overall. The effects of the retirement replacement 
rate and the real interest rate are negative but 
often not statistically significant. The BIC select 
the PW specification as the optimal one, but the 
two candidate models have comparable fits.
A1.2.4   The relation between saving, 
investment and the current account
In a closed economy aggregate saving must 
equal aggregate investment. Both variables are 
endogenous variables in macroeconomic models, 
and they will usually depend on the interest rate, 
current income, expected future income, expected 
net profitability and other variables. In general, 
economies are open to trade in goods and services, 
and they allow free movement of capital. In this 
case, the residents in one country can borrow and 
lend across borders either directly or more likely 
through financial intermediaries, and the relation 
between domestic savings and investment must 
be extended by international flows of financial 
assets. The associated stock variable to the 
current account balance is the net international 
investment position of a country. If a country is a 
net creditor, like Germany, the net international 
investment position is positive, which implies 
Turning to the additional control variables in the 
regression model, household saving depends on 
many institutional factors, including the coverage 
and generosity of the social security and welfare 
systems. The more inclusive and generous these 
systems are, the lower the incentive to save for 
retirement or to save against the loss of income 
due to disability will be. Household saving may 
also depend on the tax system. The relevant 
parameters of the tax code may include the tax 
burden on consumption relative to household 
income, or taxes on capital gains and inheritance. 
The effect of the real interest rate can be 
ambiguous, as the income and substitution effect 
associated with a higher interest rate affect saving 
in opposite ways. The substitution effect of the real 
interest rate depends on the change in the relative 
price between current and future consumption. A 
rising interest rate makes current consumption 
more expensive relative to future consumption, 
because the higher rate of return would permit a 
relatively higher future consumption level. The 
substitution effect will always lead to an increase 
in savings in response to higher interest rates. The 
income effect accrues from higher interest income 
resulting from an upward shift in the interest 
rate. This allows households to reach their target 
level of savings more quickly and it will therefore 
dampen their capital accumulation. 
Turning to business saving, a higher interest rate 
increases the user cost of capital, which is the 
theoretical price of capital for a profit-maximizing 
firm. The concept of the user costs of capital, or 
its shadow price, plays a prominent role in the 
neoclassical theory of investment. Higher interest 
rates should make business investment less 
attractive. In the two recent decades, however, 
investment expenditure has been remarkably 
insensitive to changes in the interest rate, so that 
the sign of the overall effect of real interest rate 
remains an open empirical question. The user 
costs of capital also depend on the tax and subsidy 
system. We would expect the overall effect of the 
real interest rate to be negative, especially since 
investment is likely to be sensitive to the interest 
rate. The effect of the business cycle on firm 
saving is ambiguous, as both cash flow (profits) 
and financing constraints as well as investment 
spending tend to follow the cycle. 
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Next, we can substitute savings by the difference 
between aggregate income and consumption, 
Ct. The aggregate income of an open economy 
comprises domestic output, Yt, and the net inflow 
of capital income from the rest of the world NIIPt, 
where rt denotes the return on net foreign assets.
A1.2.5  Inflation
The central bank can affect nominal GDP in 
the short run by increasing or decreasing the 
money supply or its target interest rate. Raising 
or lowering the target interest rate constitutes a 
classic transient shock to an economy. The stance 
of monetary policy is defined with respect to the 
natural rate of interest. The natural rate of interest 
is a short-term interest rate that is compatible 
with potential output and stable inflation. Setting 
the policy rate equal to the natural rate would 
happen if the output gap is closed and the inflation 
rate is within the desired range (Taylor, 1993). 
Monetary policy is said to be restrictive if the 
target rate is greater than the natural rate. The 
that this coun-try has a claim on foreign output, 
i.e. it owns assets issued by a foreign institution 
providing an interest or a dividend stream. If a 
country is a debtor country, like the USA, the net 
in-ternational investment position is negative, 
which implies that this country owes part of 
domestic output to foreign creditors, i.e. this 
country issues securities to foreigners and pays 
interest or dividends to foreigners.
The current account balance of a single year 
corresponds to the change in the net inter-
national investment position (given no change 
in the value of international assets). If we allow 
for changes in valuation, e.g. due to exchange 
rate movements, price changes or a depreciation 
of non-performing assets, the change in the net 
international investment position would include 
an extra position showing changes in valuation.
Because the current account, CAt, of an open 
economy reflects the imbalance between domestic 
savings, St, and investment, It, we can use the 
following identity:
tABLe A1.3  Aggregate saving
F.E.1 F.E.1 FGLS FGLS PW PW
Ageing indicators
Young dependency ratio
–0.407 *** –0.323 *** –0.232 *** –0.161 ** –0.245 –0.204 **
(–7.09) (–6.61) (–3.77) (–2.76) (–1.55) (–2.61)
Old dependency ratio
–0.883 *** –0.807 *** –0.520 *** –0.282 ** –0.489 –0.344 *
(–12.53) (–10.37) (–4.72) (–2.80) (–1.83) (–2.44)
Macroeconomic indicators
Output gap
0.466 *** 0.481 *** 0.491 ***
(9.10) (24.58) (16.63)
Retirement replacement rate (single)
–5.974 *** –1.404 * –1.377
(–3.79) (–2.15) (–1.20)
Real interest rate
–0.130 * –0.0161 –0.0132
(–2.19) (–0.78) (–0.43)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies no no no no no no
H0: Cross-sectional independence 7.1 *** 1.2
H0: Absence of serial correlation 332.2 *** 132.4 ***
H0: Groupwise hemogeneity 777.5 *** 896.2 ***
BIC 5168 5086
Years 36 36 36 36 36 36
Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13
1 Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent level of significance.
CAt = St–It = Yt + rt NIIPt – Ct – It. (A11)
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Turning to the other control variables, we include 
the previous year‘s output gap as a measure of 
inflationary pressure due to cyclical fluctuations 
in aggregate demand. The second control variable 
is an estimate of the natural rate of interest. 
The natural rate of interest is the rate that is 
compatible with the normal degree of aggregate 
capacity utilization, i.e. when actual output equals 
potential output (zero output gap). The rate of 
interest is thus neutral with respect to inflation. 
We use the aggregate of the monthly estimates 
for the USA, the Euro area and the UK published 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, obtained 
using the one-sided version of the Holston et al. 
(2017) model. The Euro area estimate is assigned 
to each Euro area member state in our sample. As 
for Denmark, Japan and Sweden, we estimate the 
natural rate by applying the ubiquitous HP filter to 
the short-term real interest rate. The short-term 
rate should trace the natural rate if the central 
bank raises the short-term rate in response to 
inflationary pressures and cuts the rate once the 
pressure abates. The underlying assumption is, 
of course, that economic activity and prices react 
to policy changes in a timely fashion. Finally, we 
include trade openness. In general, the more open 
the economy is, the more pronounced the effect of 
import prices and exchange rate fluctuations on 
inflation will be.
The estimates are collected in Table A1.4. Each of the 
eight specifications return positive coefficients on 
demographic variables, corroborating the existing 
empirical evidence and the life-cycle hypothesis. 
The inclusion of time-fixed effects leads to smaller 
coefficients on demographic variables, leading to 
a loss of statistical significance. The lagged output 
gap has the expected positive sign. Higher than 
normal levels of aggregate capacity utilizations 
are indicated by a positive output gap and tend 
to increase inflation in the following year. The 
natural rate of interest has a positive and often 
statistically significant effect on inflation. All 
models show a positive effect of trade openness 
on inflation. The BIC model selection criterion 
suggests that the FGLS regression with the time-
fixed effects offers the best trade-off between the 
size of the errors and the model complexity. We 
pick this specification as our final model.
monetary policy should be accommodative if the 
policy rate is lower than the natural rate. A central 
bank will raise the target rate if the inflation rate 
is above the desired level and lower the target rate 
if inflation is too low. Alternatively, the central 
bank can base its stabilization policy on the 
unemployment rate. If the unemployment rate is 
above the natural level (NAWRU), this signals the 
need for a more accommodative monetary policy.
Like potential output and the NAWRU, the natural 
rate of interest cannot be observed and must 
be estimated indirectly. Capturing the effect of 
financial factors, productivity or risk preferences of 
households pose additional empirical challenges. 
Estimates show that the natural rates of interest 
in the USA and the euro area have been decreasing. 
The natural rates have declined sharply in the 
wake of the global financial and economic crisis of 
2008 and even became negative in the euro area 
(Brand et al., 2018).
Conventional economic wisdom holds that, 
in the long run, inflation is a purely monetary 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, the empirical 
literature has identified population ageing as 
one of the few structural determinants whose 
relationship to inflation appears to be robust 
(Juselius – Takáts, 2018). This empirical evidence 
claims to account for exceptionally low inflation 
rates experienced by advanced economies in the 
past decades, and a sluggish reaction of inflation 
to monetary policy.
The study by Juselius – Takáts (2018) uses a 
particularly long set of data from 22 advanced 
economies from 1870 to 2016 to demonstrate that 
the increase in the dependent population ratio 
(children, adolescents, young adults and retirees) 
tends to positively correlate with higher inflation 
rates, but also that the effect becomes negative 
when the share of the oldest cohorts (80+) in 
the total population increases. These findings 
are consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis 
mentioned in the previous section. We therefore 
use the same set of demographic indicators as 
in the previous section where we discuss the 
modelling of the aggregate savings rate.
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smoothing state space models. The inclusion of 
a damping trend in the smoothing model ensures 
that projections stabilize in the future rather than 
increase or decrease indefinitely. This levelling off 
is desirable given that steep trends observed in the 
past – for example, the steep fall in the price of ICT 
equipment – are unlikely to persist over the long 
term. We therefore should expect more moderate 
price dynamics in the long run. The open question 
is at what level and how soon a series will level off. 
The following specification ensures convergence, 
such that the level and the rate of convergence 
are determined endogenously by the estimated 
model parameters. The exponential smoothing 
state space model can be used for smoothing 
historical data and for forecasting. We will use this 
model for forecasting only and rely on the HP filter 
for extracting past trends, as this is the current 
practice in the EC modelling approach.
The exponential smoothing state space model for 
a time series Xt with additive errors generated by a 
single disturbance term ϵt~N(0,σ2) can be written as:
A1.3 Projections
This section describes the methodology for 
developing long-term projections. Since our 
methodology takes many elements from the 
methodology detailed in the technical appendix 
of the Ageing Report (European Commission, 
2017), especially with respect to the labour market, 
the following exposition will focus on variables 
used in the panel regressions presented in the 
previous section. The empirical models contain 
several exogenous variables whose future paths are 
required for a projection. We begin our discussion by 
showcasing the univariate exponential smoothing 
as a method of obtaining long-term forecasts of 
exogenous variables (Hyndman et al., 2008).
A1.3.1  Univariate Forecasting using 
Exponential Smoothing
Some exogenous input variables, such as the 
degree of openness or the price of ICT capital, 
are projected univariately using exponential 
tABLe A1.4  Inflation
F.E.1 F.E.1 FGLS FGLS FGLS PW PW PW
Ageing indicators
Young dependency ratio
0.706 *** 0.751 *** 0.676 *** 0.771 *** 0.173 * 0.856 *** 0.906 *** 0.204
(5.04) (5.17) (9.30) (10.43) (2.07) (5.33) (6.88) (1.78)
Old dependency ratio
0.354 *** 0.409 *** 0.361 *** 0.252 *** 0.121 0.475 ** 0.347 * 0.148
(3.62) (4.53) (6.79) (4.22) (1.74) (2.60) (2.31) (1.16)
Macroeconomic indicators
Previous year‘s output gap
0.141 * 0.145 *** 0.221 *** 0.118 * 0.197 ***
(2.30) (5.90) (8.03) (2.10) (4.33)
Natural rate of interest
0.320 ** 0.404 *** 0.155 * 0.495 *** 0.121
(3.30) (6.34) (2.39) (3.66) (1.28)
Trade openness
0.0353 ** 0.0722 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0944 *** 0.0502 **
(2.74) (8.61) (4.85) (5.98) (3.08)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies no no no no yes no no yes
H0: Cross-sectional 
independence 
18.3 *** 14.6 ***
H0: Absence of serial 
correlation
48.4 *** 51.1 ***
H0: Groupwise hemogeneity 124.7 *** 178.9 ***
BIC 4259 4231 4534 4523
Years 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
1 Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics; *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent level of significance.
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based on three age cohorts: 15–24, 25–54, 55–65 
and two sexes. The Ageing Report publishes 
participation rates for these six cohorts in five-
year intervals, cf. Table 2.2. To obtain annual 
time series, we fill the missing years using linear 
interpolation. The updated labour force projections 
are thus based on the participation rates assumed 
in the Ageing Report 2018 combined with the most 
recent population scenario.
The next step is to project the rate of gainful 
employment. For this we need to project the 
unemployment rate. The projections of 
unemployment rates combine the most recent 
NAWRU estimates by the EC obtained using the 
methodology described in Havik et al. (2014) with 
the long-run assumptions detailed in the technical 
supplement to the Ageing Report (European 
Commission, 2017). Since, conceptually, the 
NAWRU represents the rate of unemployment in 
the long run, the EC methodology assumes the 
convergence of the actual unemployment rate to 
the NAWRU over the medium term (t+5), which 
in turn converges to an anchor value in the long 
term. This assumption corresponds to a closing of 
the output gap over the five-year period. Starting 
from t+5, the NAWRU thus represents the actual 
unemployment rate.
The anchor value essentially represents those 
determinants of the unemployment rate that 
can be traced to structural determinants of 
unemployment and labour market institutions. 
Orlandi (2012) argues that empirical factors that 
explain actual unemployment can also explain 
the trends of the actual unemployment rates 
represented by the NAWRU. Orlandi (2012) 
estimates panel regression models, separately for 
the old and the new member states. The anchor 
values for each country are based on the estimated 
coefficients of the panel models.
The structural factors used by Orlandi (2012) 
concentrate on the reservation wage and other 
determinants of the probability of a match 
between a job seeker and a firm. The reservation 
wage is the lowest wage rate at which workers 
are willing to accept a job. Increases in labour 
taxes or unemployment benefits (replacement 
rates) tend to raise the reservation wage and 
Here α ϵ (0,1) and β ϵ (0,1) are the smoothing 
parameters. The damping parameter ϕ ϵ (0,1) 
controls the rate of change of the trend. Equation 
(A12b) describes the level and equation (A12c) the 
change in the level. This interpretation of the two 
equations follows from the fact that an h-step 
ahead forecast of Xt tends to lt in the absence 
of damping (ϕ = 0). In the presence of damping 
(ϕ > 0) this limit equals lt+
ϕ/(1–ϕ) bt. To see this, 
observe that an h-step ahead forecast of Xt at time 
t is given by
The forecast converges to lt+
ϕ/(1–ϕ) bt for hk∞. 
The output of such a model comprises the 
estimates of α, β, ϕ and σ, as well as the paths of the 
unobserved components lt and bt and the forecast 
of the variable itself. 
A1.3.2   Projecting Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP)
Obtaining a long-term path of real GDP requires 
projecting the three inputs of the production 
function (A1). When combined, these three inputs 
yield a projection of potential output, which 
conceptually represents real GDP in the long-run, 
i.e. when cyclical fluctuations first abate and then 
disappear, and the output gap closes.
Labour input
Our projections of the labour input as defined by 
equation (A2) update the projections published 
by the EC in the Ageing Report 2018 (European 
Commission, 2018) by incorporating the latest 
main population scenario of 2019 by Eurostat and 
the current forecast by the European Commission 
from spring 2019. The labour input in persons is 
Xt = lt–1 + ϕbt–1 + ϵt , (A12a)
lt = αlt–1 + αϕbt–1 + αϵt , (A12b)
bt = ϕbt–1 + αβϵt .  (A12c)
Xt + h|t = lt + bt ∑i = 1 ϕi (A13a)
lt = αYt + α(1–α)(lt–1 + ϕbt–1), (A13b)
bt = βΔlt + (1–β) ϕbt–1. (A13c)
̂ h
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The final step in projecting labour input involves 
average working hours. The methodology of the 
Ageing Report assumes constant average working 
hours for the age-sex cohorts in each country. 
Unfortunately, the Report does not publish the 
actual paths of the working hours or the total 
labour input. We therefore sourced the OECD 
data for the average working hours in 2017. The 
projection assumes constant working hours 
for three age-cohorts: 15–24, 25–54, 55–65 and 
two sexes. This assumption implies that future 
changes in total working hours emanate solely 
from shifting shares among age groups and both 
sexes.
Capital Input
The evolution of the capital stock is computed by 
applying the perpetual inventory method. Let It be 
the investment at time t and ρ ϵ (0,1) is a constant 
rate of depreciation, then the perpetual inventory 
method defines the law of motion for the net 
capital stock Kt as
The second term says that a certain constant 
fraction of the previous year‘s capital stock is lost 
due to economic obsolescence of physical wear 
and tear. To project the capital stock, we thus only 
need to project investment. The EC methodology 
uses an estimate of the ratio of investment to 
potential output, which is assumed to follow a 
univariate autoregressive process, as detailed in 
(Havik et al. (2014), p. 76 and 77)5. When combined 
with the estimates of potential output, univariate 
forecasts for the investment ratio produce a path 
for investment, which in turn delivers the path of 
capital stock when substituted into equation (A14).
The above procedure is used to develop projections 
till t+10. Projections beyond this horizon make 
use of the idea that capital accumulation in the 
long run must be balanced against the growth of 
labour input and productivity growth. To achieve 
a balanced growth path, the ratio of capital to 
5 There are exceptions to this rule, notably Germany, 
where a different adjustment procedure is used. 
Investment paths for the new member states are also 
obtained using more ad hoc procedures.
lower labour supply. Strong trade unions tend 
to create the insider-outsider situation, in 
which the unemployed cannot underbid the 
current wage (Lindbeck – Snower, 2001). In 
this environment, external adverse shocks to 
employment may lead to a permanent increase in 
the rate of unemployment (Blanchard – Summers, 
1986). These structural and institutional labour 
market conditions belong to the set of supply-
side determinants of unemployment. On the 
demand side, successful active labour market 
policies provide training that may otherwise have 
to be provided by the employer. They facilitate 
the search, thus improving the probability of a 
successful match.
The non-structural factors that are likely to affect 
the equilibrium unemployment rate include the 
rate of technical progress represented by TFP 
growth and the real interest rate. Changes in 
productivity growth affect unemployment through 
labour demand in the short term and through the 
substitution between labour and capital in a long-
run perspective. An increase in the real interest 
rate depresses investment, which in turn lowers 
labour demand. The relative importance of the 
construction sector is an example of a persistently 
operating cyclical factor. In several European 
countries, unsustainable developments in the 
construction sector have exacerbated the impact 
to the global financial and economic crisis on the 
economy and the labour market.
The anchor value for the NAWRU represents 
a country-specific estimate of the value to 
which the NAWRU should converge in the long 
run. However, the EC methodology imposes 
additional convergence criteria for the member 
states‘ NAWRU to avoid „extrapolating into 
the far future very high unemployment rate 
values.“ (European Commission, 2017, p. 58). 
We adopt this assumption by using the long-
term unemployment rates as published in the 
Ageing Report 2018. A smooth transition between 
the updated NAWRU projections in the medium-
term and the long-term values in the Report is 
achieved by using a linear interpolation between 
the corresponding starting and end points.
Kt = It + (1–ρ)Kt–1.  (A14)
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the economy. The future paths of openness and 
the price of ICT are obtained using the exponential 
smoothing state space model described in A 1.3.1. 
For simplicity, both the real rate of interest and 
the natural rate of interest have been set at 1 
percent for all countries. The replacement rate 
of the pension system has been kept constant for 
the whole projection period, as this quantity is an 
institutional variable. The output gap is assumed 
to halve every year and thus to converge to zero 
rather quickly.
To achieve a smooth transition from the current 
value to the first projection value, the country-
specific residuals of the panel regression models 
have been kept constant rather than set to zero. 
Doing so is particularly important for models that 
contain time effects reflecting past trends, since 
they cannot be meaningfully extrapolated in the 
future. Working with end-of-estimation sample 
residuals helps to achieve a smooth transition 
between the observed data and their projections, 
while also allowing demographic projections to 
play a role in shaping the future paths. In a 
final step, all trending series, such as the TFP 
trend, ICT intensity and potential output, have 
been subsequently smoothed using an HP filter 
with the smoothing parameter λ = 100. This last 
step ensures a smooth transition. The effect of 
smoothing is negligible beyond the first year of 
the projection, because the trending series are 
already quite smooth by construction.
Our closing remark pertains to the estimates 
for Japan and the USA. Both countries are not 
included in the Ageing Report 2018. Nevertheless, 
projections for participation rates and the 
current average hours worked are available for 
both countries from other sources. The NAWRU 
estimate is available for the USA but not for Japan. 
For Japan, we estimate the NAWRU by applying the 
HP filter to the time series for unemployment. The 
remaining estimates all follow our extension of 
the EC methodology of the recent Ageing Report.
labour expressed in efficiency units must converge 
to a constant. This balancing ensures that an 
economy will follow a steady state path eventually. 
However, imposing a constant ratio may cause an 
implausibly sharp jump in investment. To avoid 
this, the EC methodology moves the point of 
convergence further out and assumes a gradual 
(linear) adjustment until convergence is achieved. 
Specifically, the 2018 Ageing Report assumes the 
equality of capital and labour (in efficiency units) 
from 2034 onwards. The above two-step procedure 
defines the future evolution of the capital stock.
Productivity Input (TFP)
The methodology used to project the TFP growth 
in this study fundamentally differs from the 
way the EC projects productivity trends. The EC 
defines a scenario in which the group of countries 
whose current GDP per capita is above the average 
GDP per capita of all member states converges 
to 1 percent TFP growth in the long run (0.8 
percent by 2045). The rates of convergence for 
the other countries inversely depend on their 
current relative GDP per capita. The further they 
are from the average, the faster their productivity 
will grow. In our sample, only Italy and Spain are 
currently below the EU28 average, so they should 
experience slightly faster rates of productivity 
growth than, say, Germany, France or Austria. 
Nevertheless, this effect is negligibly small, 
since these countries are only slightly below the 
current average. The convergence-based boost to 
economic growth is markedly stronger for the new 
member states, whose per capita incomes are well 
below the average. In the very long term, however, 
the TFP trend should settle to an annual rate of 1 
percent in all member states. In view of the labour 
share of 0.65, this TFP growth implies a growth of 
labour productivity of 1.5 percent per year.
The aim of this study is to account for the effect 
of an ageing population on productivity growth. 
We therefore use the empirical models for the 
TFP trend, ICT intensity (including software) and 
the savings rate estimated in Section A1.2 to 
simultaneously determine the future TFP path. 
Simultaneity is inevitable since the TFP trend 
depends on the ICT intensity as our simple proxy 
for investment in automation and digitisation of 
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Growth of working-age 
population
wpg eurostat, Population on 1st january by age and sex; Population projections at 
national level (2018–2100), june 2019;
united Nations, Department of economic and social Affairs, Population Division 
(2019). World Population Prospects 2019, online edition.
ICT intensity ict oeCD, National Accounts statistics;
Kirsten jäger (the Conference Board), eu KLems growth and Productivity 
Accounts 2017 release – Description of methodology and general Notes, revised 
july 2018.
Natural rate of interest nr Natural rate of interest, holston-Laubach-Williams (one-sided), federal reserve 
Bank of New york;
european Commission, AmeCo, spring 2019.
Old dependency ratio owr eurostat, Population on 1st january by age and sex; Population projections at 
national level (2018–2100), june 2019;
united Nations, Department of economic and social Affairs, Population Division 
(2019). World Population Prospects 2019, online edition.
Output gap ygap european Commission, CirCABC, output gaps.
Ratio of old to middle-
aged workers
omr eurostat, Population on 1st january by age and sex; Population projections at 
national level (2018–2100), june 2019;
united Nations, Department of economic and social Affairs, Population Division 
(2019). World Population Prospects 2019, online edition.
Real interest rate rr european Commission, AmeCo, spring 2019.
Retirement replacement 
rate (single)
penrr Égert, gal and Wanner (2017), “structural policy indicators database for economic 
research (sPiDer)”, oeCD economics Department Working Paper No. 1429.
Savings rate sr european Commission, AmeCo, spring 2019.
Trade openness openness european Commission, AmeCo, spring 2019.
US deflator of ICT 
capital
uspict oeCD, National Accounts statistics.
Young dependency ratio ywr eurostat database, Population on 1st january by age and sex; Population 
projections at national level (2018–2100), june 2019;
united Nations, Department of economic and social Affairs, Population Division 
(2019). World Population Prospects 2019, online edition.
A1.4 Data Sources
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tABLe A1.5   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP Trend – 
Potential Output – Average annual percentage changes
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
ø 2018–2030 ø 2030–2040 ø 2040–2050
Deviation from baseline in percentage points
Austria
constant population 0.27 0.00 –0.16
projected population without automation 0.13 –0.12 –0.29
projected population including automation 0.13 –0.12 –0.29
France
constant population 0.04 –0.11 –0.11
projected population without automation –0.04 –0.16 –0.10
projected population including automation –0.03 –0.17 –0.10
Germany
constant population –0.11 –0.42 –0.41
projected population without automation –0.22 –0.44 –0.44
projected population including automation –0.23 –0.44 –0.44
Italy
constant population –0.24 –0.66 –0.97
projected population without automation –0.50 –1.02 –1.18
projected population including automation –0.49 –1.02 –1.19
Spain
constant population 0.23 –0.19 –0.47
projected population without automation 0.00 –0.61 –0.76
projected population including automation 0.01 –0.61 –0.77
Japan
constant population –0.76 –0.84 –1.22
projected population without automation –0.94 –1.26 –1.58
projected population including automation –0.93 –1.26 –1.59
USA
constant population 0.28 0.19 0.33
projected population without automation 0.33 0.30 0.38
projected population including automation 0.33 0.30 0.38
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018.
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tABLe A1.6   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP Trend – 
Potential output per capita in 2010 Euro
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
2030 2040 2050
Deviation from baseline in percentage points
Austria
constant population –1,099 –2,848 –5,044
projected population without automation –1,820 –4,223 –7,234
projected population including automation –1,821 –4,230 –7,219
France
constant population –1,004 –2,780 –4,149
projected population without automation –1,340 –3,368 –4,759
projected population including automation –1,332 –3,374 –4,785
Germany
constant population –1,002 –2,948 –5,029
projected population without automation –1,612 –3,716 –6,054
projected population including automation –1,612 –3,732 –6,053
Italy
constant population –117 –1,514 –3,567
projected population without automation –1,006 –3,442 –6,072
projected population including automation –968 –3,420 –6,077
Spain
constant population 15 –1,342 –3,525
projected population without automation –750 –3,409 –6,548
projected population including automation –723 –3,387 –6,565
Japan
constant population –1,937 –3,333 –7,037
projected population without automation –2,838 –6,467 –12,469
projected population including automation –2,759 –6,377 –12,423
USA
constant population –1,381 –3,024 –3,525
projected population without automation –1,124 –2,196 –2,310
projected population including automation –1,146 –2,222 –2,314
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018.
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tABLe A1.7   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP Trend – 
Productivity (Production per hour worked) – Average annual percentage changes
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
ø 2018–2030 ø 2030–2040 ø 2040–2050
Deviation from baseline in percentage points
Austria
constant population –0.05 0.01 –0.02
projected population without automation –0.18 –0.11 –0.15
projected population including automation –0.18 –0.11 –0.15
France
constant population –0.04 0.01 –0.01
projected population without automation –0.11 –0.04 0.00
projected population including automation –0.11 –0.04 –0.01
Germany
constant population 0.00 –0.01 –0.04
projected population without automation –0.11 –0.03 –0.08
projected population including automation –0.12 –0.03 –0.07
Italy
constant population 0.01 0.01 0.00
projected population without automation –0.25 –0.35 –0.22
projected population including automation –0.24 –0.36 –0.23
Spain
constant population –0.06 0.01 0.02
projected population without automation –0.29 –0.41 –0.27
projected population including automation –0.28 –0.41 –0.28
Japan
constant population 0.12 –0.04 0.09
projected population without automation –0.06 –0.46 –0.27
projected population including automation –0.05 –0.46 –0.28
USA
constant population –0.08 0.03 –0.03
projected population without automation –0.04 0.13 0.02
projected population including automation –0.04 0.13 0.03
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018.
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tABLe A1.8   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP Trend– Gross 
domestic saving – As a percentage of GDP
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
ø 2018–2030 ø 2030–2040 ø 2040–2050
Deviation from baseline in percentage points
Austria
constant population –0.64 –2.16 –2.74
projected population without automation –0.64 –2.16 –2.74
projected population including automation –0.64 –2.16 –2.74
France
constant population –0.80 –1.94 –2.35
projected population without automation –0.80 –1.94 –2.35
projected population including automation –0.80 –1.94 –2.35
Germany
constant population –0.65 –2.09 –2.32
projected population without automation –0.65 –2.09 –2.32
projected population including automation –0.65 –2.09 –2.32
Italy
constant population –0.81 –2.76 –4.03
projected population without automation –0.81 –2.76 –4.03
projected population including automation –0.81 –2.76 –4.03
Spain
constant population –0.80 –2.69 –4.24
projected population without automation –0.80 –2.69 –4.24
projected population including automation –0.80 –2.69 –4.24
Japan
constant population –0.66 –1.83 –3.14
projected population without automation –0.66 –1.83 –3.14
projected population including automation –0.66 –1.83 –3.14
USA
constant population –0.88 –1.84 –2.12
projected population without automation –0.88 –1.84 –2.12
projected population including automation –0.88 –1.84 –2.12
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018.
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tABLe A1.9   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP Trend – 
Gross fixed capital formation – As a percentage of potential GDP
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
2030 2040 2050
Deviation from baseline in percentage points
Austria
constant population 0.76 –0.74 –0.03
projected population without automation 0.27 –1.03 –0.53
projected population including automation 0.26 –1.02 –0.51
France
constant population –0.20 –0.50 –0.08
projected population without automation –0.45 –0.53 0.02
projected population including automation –0.45 –0.54 0.01
Germany
constant population –0.53 –1.51 0.08
projected population without automation –0.74 –1.43 –0.07
projected population including automation –0.76 –1.44 –0.06
Italy
constant population –1.07 –2.84 –2.90
projected population without automation –2.30 –3.72 –3.38
projected population including automation –2.30 –3.76 –3.41
Spain
constant population 0.26 –1.41 –1.95
projected population without automation –0.96 –2.66 –2.51
projected population including automation –0.94 –2.70 –2.56
Japan
constant population –1.59 –2.03 –3.76
projected population without automation –2.52 –3.13 –4.53
projected population including automation –2.50 –3.16 –4.56
USA
constant population 0.22 0.34 0.65
projected population without automation 0.42 0.54 0.66
projected population including automation 0.41 0.55 0.68
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018.
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tABLe A1.10   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP Trend– 
Current account balance – As a percentage of GDP
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
2030 2040 2050
Deviation from baseline in percentage points
Austria
constant population –2.18 –1.82 –2.91
projected population without automation –1.70 –1.53 –2.41
projected population including automation –1.68 –1.53 –2.42
France
constant population –1.24 –1.77 –2.32
projected population without automation –1.00 –1.74 –2.43
projected population including automation –0.99 –1.73 –2.42
Germany
constant population –0.91 –0.80 –2.45
projected population without automation –0.70 –0.87 –2.30
projected population including automation –0.67 –0.87 –2.31
Italy
constant population –0.63 –0.72 –1.30
projected population without automation 0.60 0.16 –0.82
projected population including automation 0.60 0.20 –0.79
Spain
constant population –1.95 –2.09 –2.61
projected population without automation –0.73 –0.83 –2.05
projected population including automation –0.75 –0.79 –2.00
Japan
constant population 0.46 –0.58 0.28
projected population without automation 1.39 0.51 1.05
projected population including automation 1.37 0.54 1.08
USA
constant population –1.75 –2.35 –2.90
projected population without automation –1.95 –2.55 –2.92
projected population including automation –1.95 –2.56 –2.93
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018.
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tABLe A1.11   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP Trend – 
Consumer Price Index – Average annual percentage changes 
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
ø 2018–2030 ø 2030–2040 ø 2040–2050
Deviation from baseline in percentage points
Austria
constant population 0.23 0.78 1.01
projected population without automation 0.23 0.78 1.01
projected population including automation 0.23 0.78 1.01
France
constant population 0.29 0.74 0.93
projected population without automation 0.29 0.74 0.93
projected population including automation 0.29 0.74 0.93
Germany
constant population 0.24 0.79 0.91
projected population without automation 0.24 0.79 0.91
projected population including automation 0.24 0.79 0.91
Italy
constant population 0.32 1.18 1.87
projected population without automation 0.32 1.18 1.87
projected population including automation 0.32 1.18 1.87
Spain
constant population 0.30 1.07 1.75
projected population without automation 0.30 1.07 1.75
projected population including automation 0.30 1.07 1.75
Japan
constant population 0.23 0.66 1.15
projected population without automation 0.23 0.66 1.15
projected population including automation 0.23 0.66 1.15
USA
constant population 0.31 0.66 0.77
projected population without automation 0.31 0.66 0.77
projected population including automation 0.31 0.66 0.77
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018.
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tABLe A1.12   Decomposition of direct and indirect effects from demographics on TFP Trend –  
TFP growth – Average annual percentage changes 
Szenario: TFP-growth at …
ø 2018–2030 ø 2030–2040 ø 2040–2050
Deviation from baseline in percentage points
Austria
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population without automation –0.10 –0.07 –0.09
projected population including automation –0.10 –0.07 –0.09
France
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population without automation –0.05 –0.03 0.01
projected population including automation –0.05 –0.04 0.01
Germany
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population without automation –0.09 0.00 –0.03
projected population including automation –0.09 0.00 –0.03
Italy
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population without automation –0.17 –0.24 –0.13
projected population including automation –0.16 –0.24 –0.13
Spain
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population without automation –0.15 –0.29 –0.17
projected population including automation –0.14 –0.29 –0.18
Japan
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population without automation –0.11 –0.29 –0.22
projected population including automation –0.10 –0.29 –0.23
USA
constant population 0.00 0.00 0.00
projected population without automation 0.03 0.07 0.03
projected population including automation 0.03 0.07 0.03
Note: Baseline assumes constant population fixed at values from 2018.
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